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CONDITIONAL SPENDING AFTER NFIB V. 
SEBELIUS:  THE EXAMPLE OF FEDERAL 
EDUCATION LAW 
 
 
ELOISE PASACHOFF∗ 
In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court’s recent case addressing the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, the Court concluded that the Act’s 
expansion of Medicaid was unconstitutionally coercive and therefore exceeded 
the scope of Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause.  This was the 
first time that the Court treated coercion as an issue of more than theoretical 
possibility under the Spending Clause.  In the wake of the Court’s decision, 
commentators have expressed either the concern or the hope that NFIB’s 
coercion analysis may lead to the undoing of much of the federal regulatory 
state, which substantially relies on the spending power.  This Article argues 
that both this concern and this hope are misplaced. 
Taking federal education law as a test case for future coercion analysis—
since federal funding given to the states for elementary and secondary 
education is second only to federal funding given to the states for Medicaid—
this Article concludes that NFIB’s coercion inquiry is unlikely to lead to much 
else being found unconstitutional.  The major federal education laws, and by 
implication other conditional spending laws, will not likely find their demise 
under the Court’s analysis. 
Nonetheless, NFIB will likely have some effect on the future of federal 
education law and other laws that rely on Congress’s spending powers.  It 
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should put a damper on calls to dramatically increase federal education 
funding; encourage the trend towards smaller grants of limited duration, 
especially those that bypass the states; result in some structural changes both in 
funding and enforcement; and, somewhat paradoxically for a decision that 
found the Medicaid enforcement regime coercive, may lead to greater federal 
enforcement of conditional spending laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The sleeper issue in National Federation of Independent Business 
(NFIB) v. Sebelius,1 the Supreme Court’s recent case considering the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, was the question of 
whether that Act’s expansion of Medicaid violated the Spending 
Clause of the Constitution.  It was a surprise that the Court agreed to 
hear this part of the case at all.  While the lower courts had divided 
on the question of whether the Act’s mandate that all individuals 
have health insurance exceeded the scope of Congress’s authority 
under the Commerce Clause,2 the cases below had unanimously 
rejected the Spending Clause argument.3  Nor was there a circuit split 
on the extent of Congress’s spending power.4  Commentators 
therefore surmised that at least one Justice was interested in 
examining, possibly narrowing, this power5—the last remaining 
congressional power that had survived, expansive and intact, through 
the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival.6 
                                                          
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2. Compare Florida ex rel Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 
F.3d 1235, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011) (deciding that the individual mandate exceeded 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause by requiring everyone, including 
healthy people, to purchase insurance), rev’d sub nom. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, with 
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding the 
individual mandate as constitutional under the Commerce Clause after finding that 
Congress had a rational basis to believe that, in the aggregate, individuals’ practice of 
purchasing health insurance substantially affects interstate commerce), abrogated by 
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, and Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(reasoning that the individual mandate is constitutional under the Commerce Clause 
because Congress could reasonably assume that uninsured people would inevitably 
enter the health care market and thereby affect it), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
 3. See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1263 (holding that the Act’s expansion 
of Medicaid was a valid exercise of the spending power because states had a real 
choice to participate or not participate in the expansion); Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1266–67 (N.D. Fla. 2011) 
(finding no coercion because states could opt out), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
 4. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18–20, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-
400), 2011 WL 4500702, at *18–20 (acknowledging no split on the Spending Clause 
issue but describing some court of appeals cases that recognized limits on Congress’s 
spending power); Consolidated Brief for Respondents at 15, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(Nos. 11-393 & 11-400), 2011 WL 4941020, at *11 (arguing against a grant of 
certiorari because of the lack of a circuit split). 
 5. See, e.g., Chuck Edwards, Supreme Court To Weigh in on Federal Grants, TITLE I-
DERLAND BLOG (Nov. 21, 2011), http://ed.complianceexpert.com/title-i-derland/title-i-
derland-1.45712/supreme-court-to-weigh-in-on-federal-grants-1.84072 (suggesting that a 
reformulation of the Court’s Spending Clause analysis would represent a threat to various 
major federal grants to states); Brad Joondeph, Big News is the Medicaid Grant, ACA LITIG. 
BLOG (Nov. 14, 2011, 7:36 AM), http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/big-
news-is-medicaid-grant.html (opining that the Court’s willingness to consider the 
Spending Clause was more significant than its review of the individual mandate). 
 6. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 
DUKE L.J. 345, 346–50 (2008) (explaining that the Rehnquist Court dramatically 
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As it happened, seven justices were apparently interested in 
revisiting Congress’s spending power.  A plurality of Chief Justice 
Roberts, joined by Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan,7 along with 
Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito in a 
joint opinion with no identified author,8 concluded that the Medicaid 
expansion violated the Spending Clause by coercing the states into 
accepting its terms.  As Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, 
noted in dissent on this point, this conclusion was of startling 
novelty.9  “[F]or the first time ever,” Justice Ginsburg noted—italics 
hers—the Court “finds an exercise of Congress’ spending power 
unconstitutionally coercive.”10 
The Court’s conclusion regarding the Spending Clause was largely 
lost in the initial hubbub over the Court’s having upheld the 
individual mandate,11 but for those who noticed, the response was 
dramatic.  From the left, scholars called the Court’s ruling on the 
Medicaid expansion “a loaded gun” that should give “Americans who 
care about economic and social justice a reason to worry this Fourth 
of July”;12 “a potential restructuring of federal-state relations” that 
could “come back in later cases to haunt the federal government”;13 
and “a really big deal” that “opens the door to challenging a bunch of 
very significant federal statutes that had not really been subject to 
effective challenge before.”14  From the right, the response was one of 
tentative hope.  As one scholar noted, “[w]e take away from NFIB v. 
Sebelius the comfort . . . that the federal government can’t compel 
                                                          
limited Congress’s regulatory powers under Article I and the Reconstruction 
Amendments but issued no opinions significantly limiting the spending power). 
 7. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–09 (plurality opinion). 
 8. Id. at 2642–60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).  Notably, 
even though these Justices were in agreement with the plurality on this point, the 
joint opinion is styled entirely as a dissent, so angered were they by the rest of the 
opinion.  The remainder of this Article thus refers to these Justices as “the joint 
dissenters” and their opinion as “the joint dissent.” 
 9. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Jordan Weissmann, The Most Important Part of Today’s Health Care Ruling 
You Haven’t Heard About, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2012, 3:33 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com 
/business/archive/2012/06/the-most-important-part-of-todays-health-care-ruling-you-
havent-heard-about/259134 (suggesting that the press would have treated the Medicaid 
holding as more significant had it not been part of the same case that dealt with the 
individual mandate). 
 12. Pamela S. Karlan, Opinion, No Respite for Liberals, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2012, at SR1. 
 13. Neal Katyal, Op-Ed, A Pyrrhic Victory, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A29. 
 14. Weissmann, supra note 11 (interviewing Professor Samuel Bagenstos). 
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states to do its bidding,” adding, “[t]he size and warmth of that 
comfort will be determined in future cases.”15 
The Supreme Court’s new coercion analysis under the Spending 
Clause is sure to lead to much litigation over the constitutionality of a 
wide variety of statutes.16  The stakes are high, potentially posing 
grave challenges for the future of Congress’s ability to enact, 
reauthorize, and enforce programs under the Spending Clause.  
Because conditional spending statutes underlie a great deal of the 
regulatory state—in education and social welfare programs,17 in 
transportation and infrastructure programs,18 and in energy and 
environmental programs19—if the Court’s coercion analysis were to 
apply broadly, it would have the potential to significantly upend the 
way the federal government functions. 
This Article considers whether, in fact, the coercion analysis will 
have this effect by using federal education law as a test case.  
Notwithstanding the popular understanding of education as a matter 
for local control—where the right to education is enshrined in state 
constitutions (but not the federal one)—federal education laws 
passed using Congress’s spending power are both wide-ranging and 
of long standing.20  Indeed, the joint dissent in NFIB recognized that 
                                                          
 15. Ilya Shapiro, We Won Everything but the Case, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2012, 
9:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/we-won-everything-but-the-case. 
 16. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2640 
(2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part) (anticipating that the Court’s decision on the Medicaid expansion 
would open the door for future Spending Clause challenges); J. Lester Feder & Darren 
Samuelsohn, The Medicaid Ruling’s Ripple Effect, POLITICO (July 3, 2012, 11:59 AM), 
http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=1CA3036B-912B-4A09-81DE-
85258564263B (suggesting the decision would encourage states to challenge conditions 
attached to federal spending  programs and could also cause Congress to act more 
cautiously when legislating under the Spending Clause). 
 17. See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941 
(2006) (authorizing the Department of Education to make federal grants to states in 
exchange for compliance with educational standards and various accountability 
measures); Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 
2112 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619 (2006)) (offering states a 
block grant of funds to provide temporary financial assistance to poor families). 
 18. See, e.g., Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:  A 
Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) (codified in scattered 
sections of 23 and 26 U.S.C.) (authorizing conditional funds for transportation and 
highway programs). 
 19. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006) (conditioning certain 
federal funds on states’ enforcement of pollution standards). 
 20. See generally CHRISTOPHER T. CROSS, POLITICAL EDUCATION:  NATIONAL POLICY 
COMES OF AGE (2004); ELIZABETH H. DEBRAY, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND EDUCATION:  
FEDERAL POLICY DURING THE CLINTON AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS (2006); MARIS A. 
VINOVSKIS, FROM A NATION AT RISK TO NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND:  NATIONAL 
EDUCATION GOALS AND THE CREATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY (2009); TO 
EDUCATE A NATION:  FEDERAL AND NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF SCHOOL REFORM (Carl 
F. Kaestle & Alyssa E. Lodewick eds., 2007). 
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federal funding for elementary and secondary education is second 
only to federal Medicaid funding,21 while Justice Ginsburg examined 
federal enforcement of education law in her opinion.22  The two 
major federal education programs, the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA)23 (currently reauthorized as No Child Left 
Behind) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,24 are 
each, like Medicaid, “a prototypical example of federal-state 
cooperation in serving the Nation’s general welfare.”25  Both have 
been subject to some kind of coercion claims or allegations before.26  
Similarly, the civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of race, gender, and disability in public schools rely for enforcement 
on the threat of withholding funds, just like the compliance 
mechanism the NFIB Court deemed coercive with regard to 
Medicaid.27  If the coercion analysis in NFIB were to be the undoing 
of the federal regulatory state, these federal education laws could be 
next to fall.28 
As the rest of this Article shows, however, these laws are not likely 
to be found coercive, even under NFIB’s revitalization of that inquiry.  
Careful application of the factors deemed relevant to the finding of 
coercion in NFIB demonstrates that the Medicaid expansion is truly 
sui generis in its program design, in the scope of its funding, and in its 
effect on state budgets.29  Just as the Court did not disturb the 
Medicaid program in its pre-Affordable Care Act form even as the 
Court found the Medicaid expansion coercive, the existing federal 
education laws should survive any future coercion challenge.  And if 
the federal education laws withstand the NFIB Court’s coercion 
inquiry, other conditional spending programs should as well, given 
their comparatively smaller size.30 
                                                          
 21. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 22. See id. at 2637–38 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (discussing cases in which the federal 
government sought to recover funds from states that had received federal education 
grants but failed to comply with federal education law). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 24. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 
Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)). 
 25. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (describing Medicaid); cf. Schaffer ex rel. 
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (describing the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act). 
 26. See infra notes 238–43, 349–52 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 428–37 and accompanying text. 
 28. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, Ed. Law Challenges Loom After Health-Care Ruling, EDUC. 
WK., July 18, 2012, at 20. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, FISCAL YEAR 2010 STATE 
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The Article proceeds in three Parts.  In Part I, I describe the pre-
NFIB understanding of the expansive scope of Congress’s power 
under the Spending Clause; explain the difficulty scholars and courts 
have had in finding anything administrable about the coercion 
analysis; and then walk through NFIB’s analysis of coercion.  It is 
important to do this last task in some detail, as the particular facts 
that led the Court to find the Medicaid expansion coercive, as well as 
the facts the various justices found unconvincing, are the key to 
understanding why the coercion inquiry is unlikely to jeopardize 
other major spending programs, notwithstanding concerns to the 
contrary. 
I therefore provide a careful reading of the plurality opinion, 
arguing that it sets up a three-part sequential inquiry:  First, does the 
condition in question threaten to take away funds for a program that 
is separate and independent from the program to which the 
condition in question is attached, or does the condition merely 
govern the use of the funds to which it is attached?  If the latter, then 
the inquiry ends, and the program is not coercive.  Second, if the 
condition does threaten funds for an independent program, did the 
states have sufficient notice at the time they accepted funds for the 
first program that they would also have to comply with the second 
program?  If yes, then the inquiry ends once more with the 
conclusion that the program is not coercive.  Third, if there was no 
such notice, is the amount of funding at stake so significant that the 
threat to withdraw it constitutes what the plurality calls “economic 
dragooning”?  Only if this last question is reached and the answer is 
yes would a program be coercive under the plurality’s test.  I then 
examine each of these factors in detail to draw out guidance for 
future cases.  In so doing, I also explain how the joint dissent’s 
analysis differs from the plurality’s, focusing on economic 
dragooning as the sole issue of importance. 
In Part II, I apply this analysis to the major federal education laws:  
No Child Left Behind, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 
and a series of laws that apply wherever federal education funding 
exists.  I first explain how the history and structure of these laws 
could conceivably lead to new challenges under NFIB.  I then 
examine these laws through the lens of both the plurality’s and the 
joint dissent’s analysis, on the theory that the joint dissent’s analysis is 
merely one, possibly fickle, vote shy of being a majority.  Because the 
                                                          
EXPENDITURE REPORT:  EXAMINING FISCAL 2009–2011 STATE SPENDING (2011) [hereinafter 
NASBO], available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2010%20State 
%20Expenditure%20Report.pdf (describing federal contributions to state expenditures). 
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lower courts may well apply the joint dissent’s analysis as an alternate 
test, perhaps expecting that the Chief Justice may switch his vote in a 
future case, it is important to consider whether the difference 
between the plurality’s analysis and the joint dissent’s is likely to 
produce very different results.  Through careful analysis of the 
structure and funding of federal education laws, I demonstrate how 
attempts to call these laws coercive are unlikely to be successful under 
either the plurality’s or the joint dissent’s analysis. 
While in their current form these laws should survive challenges 
under NFIB, there are nonetheless implications from this analysis for 
the future of federal education law and, more broadly, the structure 
and enforcement of other federal spending programs.  In Part III, I 
consider these implications from an institutional perspective.  I 
conclude that the largest effects are not likely to be doctrinal but 
rather legislative and administrative.  As to the former, I argue that 
NFIB should put a damper on calls to dramatically increase federal 
education funding; encourage the trend toward smaller grants of 
limited duration, especially those that bypass the states; and result in 
some structural changes both in funding and enforcement.  As to the 
latter, I argue, somewhat counterintuitively, that NFIB may (and 
perhaps should) lead to increased enforcement of conditional 
spending laws. 
The bottom line is that concerns that NFIB may undo the 
regulatory state are overstated.  Litigation seeking to challenge other 
federal statutes as coercive is likely to come, but it is important to 
address these challenges as expeditiously as possible to avoid 
distraction from the important work of governance.  In fact, inviting 
such challenges may even be desirable in order to limit the 
uncertainty surrounding how Congress and agencies may continue to 
do their jobs. 
I. COERCION AND THE SPENDING CLAUSE FROM DOLE TO NFIB 
A. Dole’s Limitations on the Scope of Congress’s Authority Under the 
Spending Clause 
The Spending Clause lies in Article I, Section 8, clause 1 of the 
Constitution, which permits Congress to “lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”31  Until 
                                                          
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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NFIB, South Dakota v. Dole32 was the leading modern case setting forth 
the Court’s understanding of the contours of Congress’s spending 
power under this clause.  In Dole, the Court considered whether the 
scope of this power was exceeded by a statute permitting the 
Secretary of Transportation to withhold up to 5% of the federal 
transportation funds otherwise available to a state for any state that 
failed to set its minimum drinking age at twenty-one.33  In a 7–2 
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the 
spending power permitted such a law.34 
The Court first noted the breadth of the spending power, citing 
previous cases establishing that Congress may use this power to 
“attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds” in furtherance of 
“broad policy objectives,” and that this power is not limited to goals 
that Congress could achieve only through some other enumerated 
power.35  The Court then reviewed “several general restrictions 
articulated in our cases” that cabin Congress’s authority under this 
power.36  Notably, coercion was not among the four restrictions 
considered.  First, as the Spending Clause itself explains, the exercise 
of power under that Clause must be “in pursuit of ‘the general 
Welfare.’”37  Courts should “defer substantially” to Congress’s 
judgment that any expenditure under this power satisfies this 
restriction.38  Second, “if Congress desires to condition the States’ 
receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously . . . , 
enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of 
the consequences of their participation.’”39  Third, the conditions 
must be related “to the federal interest in particular national projects 
or programs”—what the opinion later called the “germaneness” 
requirement.40  Fourth, and “finally, . . . other constitutional 
provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant 
of federal funds.”41 
                                                          
 32. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 33. Id. at 205. 
 34. See id. at 208, 210–12. 
 35. Id. at 206–07. 
 36. Id. at 207. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 207 & n.2 (questioning whether “general welfare” is a judicially 
enforceable restriction at all). 
 39. Id. at 207 (alteration in original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 40. Id. at 207–08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 
(1978) (plurality opinion)). 
 41. Id. at 208. 
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The Court found the first three of these conditions easily 
satisfied.42  There was no doubt that Congress could have reasonably 
concluded that it was within the general welfare to try to standardize 
the minimum drinking age in different states to limit the ability of 
“young persons to combine their desire to drink with their ability to 
drive.”43  Nor was there any doubt that Congress had stated its 
conditions clearly in the legislation in question.44  The Court further 
concluded that the condition of raising the drinking age was 
germane to the federal interest in safe interstate travel, “one of the 
main purposes for which highway funds are expended.”45 
The Court ultimately found the fourth condition satisfied, but 
considered at somewhat greater length whether the Twenty-First 
Amendment provided an independent constitutional bar to the 
spending conditions at issue.46  The Court rejected the petitioner’s 
view that, because the Twenty-First Amendment precludes Congress 
from directly enacting a national minimum drinking age, the 
Spending Clause also precludes Congress’s achievement of that goal 
through a more roundabout way.47  Spending for the “general 
welfare” is not limited to what Congress can achieve through its other 
enumerated powers, the Court reiterated.48  In particular, the Court 
discussed a previous case in which it had held that “a perceived Tenth 
Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs 
did not concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately 
placed on federal grants.”49  Through the spending power, Congress 
could reach the conduct of state officials whose positions it funded in 
whole or in part, even though the Tenth Amendment would preclude 
it from regulating the conduct of these officials directly.50  The Court 
found no violation of the state’s sovereignty because the state could 
(and did) simply refuse the federal funds in question.51  In light of 
this precedent, the Court concluded that the “independent 
constitutional bar” limit on the spending power “stands for the 
unexceptionable proposition that the power may not be used to 
                                                          
 42. Id. at 208–09. 
 43. Id. at 208. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 208–09. 
 46. Id. at 209, 212. 
 47. See id. at 209–10. 
 48. Id. at 210. 
 49. Id. (considering the analysis in Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 
(1947), of a provision in the Hatch Act that permitted the federal government to 
withhold specified funds if a state permitted certain employees to engage in political 
activities). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. 
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induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be 
unconstitutional.”52 
Towards the end of the opinion, citing a case from the 1930s, the 
Court remarked that “in some circumstances the financial 
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the 
point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’”53 suggesting that 
avoiding coercion could theoretically place a fifth limitation on 
Congress’s spending power.  But, in three brief paragraphs of 
analysis, it declined to find any such coercion where the states stood 
to lose only 5% of certain highway funds if they declined to lower 
their drinking age—“relatively mild encouragement,” in the Court’s 
words.54  Nor did the Court find coercion in the fact that the states 
had largely accepted the condition and enacted the specified 
drinking-age legislation.55  In the end, the Court noted the difficulty 
of relying on the coercion inquiry, and drawing a line between 
permissible temptation and impermissible coercion, at all: “‘[T]o 
hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge 
the law in endless difficulties,’” the Court observed, quoting Justice 
Cardozo.56  “‘The outcome of such a doctrine is the acceptance of a 
philosophical determinism by which choice becomes impossible.  Till 
now the law has been guided by a robust common sense which 
assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the 
solution of its problems.’”57  The states exercised their “freedom of 
the will” by deciding whether to comply with the conditions placed 
on the highway funds, and the choice to enact higher minimum 
drinking laws “remains the prerogative of the States not merely in 
theory but in fact.”58  The Court therefore upheld the conditions as 
within the scope of the spending power.59 
B. The Limitations of Dole’s Limitations? 
In the wake of the federalism revival of the Rehnquist Court, many 
commentators observed that the breadth of the spending power 
served to undercut the tightened restrictions the Court had placed 
on Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, Section 5 of the 
                                                          
 52. Id. at 210 (explaining, as an example, that the federal government could not 
condition funds on states’ infliction of cruel and unusual punishment). 
 53. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590). 
 57. Id. (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590). 
 58. Id. at 211–12. 
 59. Id. at 212. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment.60  If Congress 
could simply attach conditions to federal grants to accomplish aims 
that it could not accomplish with direct regulation under its 
enumerated powers and without upsetting the federal-state balance 
under the Tenth Amendment, Congress’s ability to effect national 
regulation would in practice be limited only by its willingness to 
spend money, not by any real constitutional hurdle.61  Thus, with 
eager anticipation, concerned gloom, or tentative disbelief that such 
an event would happen, commentators considered how the Court 
might cut back on the scope of the spending power by tightening one 
of the limitations set forth in Dole62 or through some other means.63 
While an assessment of the post-Dole, pre-NFIB literature on the 
Spending Clause is both beyond the scope of this Article and 
unnecessary to its argument, three points are worth making here.  
First, with one exception—the requirement that Congress set forth 
the conditions attached to federal grants unambiguously—these 
arguments have received more critical commentary than judicial 
traction.64  As Professor Bagenstos has argued, a major reason why 
most of Dole’s limitations have received so little play (let alone 
success) in the courts is because they pose no “analytically tractable 
limitation on congressional power,”65 suffering variously from a level-
of-generality problem66 and a baseline problem.67  In contrast, the 
                                                          
 60. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 346–47 (describing the literature making 
this claim); Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 
126, 139–40 (2006) (observing that there is a discrepancy between the Rehnquist 
Court’s treatment of federal legislative power under Article 1 and the Reconstruction 
Amendments and its treatment of the Spending Clause). 
 61. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 347 (noting that the Court’s treatment of the 
Spending Clause led some legislators and scholars to reframe proposals in terms of 
the spending power). 
 62. See, e.g., id. at 356–80, 393–409 (canvassing and assessing arguments to make 
more robust the general welfare, germaneness, coercion, and unambiguous 
statements limitations set forth in Dole); Douglas A. Wick, Note, Rethinking Conditional 
Federal Grants and the Independent Constitutional Bar Test, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1362 
(2010) (offering a reinterpretation of the independent constitutional bar limit set 
forth in Dole, which would make the standard more robust by invalidating any 
condition that the federal government would be barred from pursuing directly). 
 63. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 384–93 (assessing the argument that 
conditions attached to federal funds are merely contractual provisions and thus do 
not involve the actual use of federal legislative power); Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting 
the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 97–100 (2001) (finding no constitutional or 
precedential support for the argument that the anti-commandeering doctrine under 
the Tenth Amendment should limit the Spending Clause). 
 64. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 346–50 (noting that the Court has not taken 
advantage of opportunities to address these arguments). 
 65. Id. at 355. 
 66. Id. at 355–67 (noting that any application of the Dole “general welfare” 
limitation would depend in part on the level of abstraction that the problem is 
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unambiguous-condition requirement has more analytic bite, and the 
Court has, in fact, expanded this requirement into a clear-notice rule 
for Spending Clause interpretation.68 
In Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy,69 for 
example, the Court explained that because the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was enacted pursuant to Congress’s 
authority under the Spending Clause, it was not enough to engage in 
ordinary statutory interpretation to determine whether the Act 
provides fee-shifting for expert fees to parents who prevail against 
school districts in litigation under the Act.70  Instead, the question was 
whether a state official, in deciding whether to accept federal funds 
under the Act, would “clearly understand” that this was one of the 
conditions under the Act.71  “In other words,” explained the Court, 
“we must ask whether the IDEA furnishes clear notice regarding the 
liability at issue in this case.”72  While such a clear-notice rule has 
some restrictive effect, limiting the enforcement of Spending Clause 
statutes on particular issues or grounds, this rule is a rule of 
interpretation, rather than a rule limiting federal power.73  That is, if 
Congress wants to reject the Court’s conclusion in Murphy that the 
IDEA does not require prevailing parents to be compensated for 
their expert fees because of the absence of a clear statement in the 
statute on the issue, all Congress need do is speak clearly on the issue 
in the future. 
This observation leads to the second point worth making here:  the 
scope of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause has remained 
extremely broad.  Congress has accordingly relied on its spending 
power to accomplish a large number of its policy objectives in a wide 
range of fields, from education and social welfare to the environment 
                                                          
viewed from, and that application of the germaneness limitation requires a 
determination of how broadly to consider relatedness). 
 67. Id. at 372–84 (explaining that the major problem with the coercion doctrine 
is that any determination that coercion exists requires making an assumption about 
states’ baseline entitlement to federal funds). 
 68. Id. at 393–409 (describing variants of the Court’s developing notice doctrine 
in Spending Clause cases). 
 69. 548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
 70. Id. at 300; see also id. at 305 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (disputing the need for a “clear notice” requirement in Spending 
Clause cases in general or this case in particular). 
 71. Id. at 296 (majority opinion) (explaining that courts must be more rigorous 
in interpreting notice in the context of conditional spending legislation, because of 
the contractual nature of such legislation). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 350 (noting that the clear notice requirement 
allows the Court to limit the spending power only indirectly). 
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and transportation,74 and states have relatively rarely filed lawsuits 
seeking declarations that statutes are unconstitutional on Spending 
Clause grounds.75  As Professor Ryan has observed, then, even though 
education policy is theoretically a matter for state and local 
governments, in the absence of serious constitutional limitations 
under the Spending Clause, “Washington has wide latitude to affect 
education policy by attaching conditions to its funding. . . .  [T]he 
only real limits on federal power over education policy are 
political.”76  While Professor Ryan was writing about education policy 
in particular, the same could be said of the wide range of other areas 
in which Congress relies on its spending power to regulate. 
The last point before turning to NFIB is merely a more particular 
version of the previous two points, but it is nonetheless important to 
make in light of the Court’s reliance on the coercion theory in NFIB:  
While scholars have struggled mightily to come up with a logically 
sound and judicially administrable version of the coercion theory 
considered (but not adopted) at the end of Dole, they have had little 
success in doing so.77  Again, Professor Bagenstos explains why: 
Determinations that a conditional offer of federal funds coerces 
the states tend to depend on normatively contestable premises 
about states’ baseline entitlement to federal largesse.  Such 
premises are “especially problematic” when considered “against the 
backdrop of a constitutional jurisprudence in which most 
redistribution is permissible and few affirmative obligations on 
government are imposed.”78 
How, then, are judges to tell “whether the states are faced . . . with 
an offer they cannot refuse or merely with a hard choice”?79  For 
these reasons, until NFIB, the coercion theory found essentially no 
approval in the courts.80  Even in the ACA litigation, no lower court 
                                                          
 74. See supra notes 17–19. 
 75. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(dismissing a Spending Clause challenge to the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act and noting, in absence of precedent, Kansas’s “very 
heavy burden in seeking to have the PRWORA declared unconstitutional”). 
 76. James E. Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers:  The Legal 
Boundaries of Education Governance, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?  THE TANGLED WEB OF 
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 42, 53 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004). 
 77. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 374–80 (critically assessing several attempted 
reformulations of the coercion test). 
 78. Id. at 372–73 (footnote omitted) (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1450 (1989)); see also Ryan, supra 
note 76, at 64–65 (explaining conceptual difficulties with coercion argument). 
 79. Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 80. See, e.g., West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 
289–90 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that most courts have “effectively abandoned any real 
effort to apply the coercion theory”).  While a minority of the en banc Fourth Circuit 
in Virginia Department of Education v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
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judge accepted the argument that the Medicaid expansion was 
coercive, even as the courts divided on the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate.81  It was therefore a surprise to many when the 
Court agreed to hear argument on this question in NFIB.82 
C. NFIB and Coercion 
In NFIB, a plurality of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and 
Justice Kagan reframed the inquiry under the Spending Clause.  As in 
Dole, the plurality explained that “our cases have recognized limits on 
Congress’s power under the Spending Clause to secure state 
compliance with federal objectives.”83  But instead of turning to the 
series of limitations articulated in Dole, the plurality narrowed the 
focus of concern.  Because “Spending Clause legislation [i]s much in 
the nature of a contract[,] . . . [t]he legitimacy of Congress’s exercise 
of the spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and 
knowingly accepts the terms of the contract.”84  A state cannot be said 
to have acted voluntarily when Congress uses “financial inducements 
to exert a ‘power akin to undue influence.’”85  Congress, the plurality 
explained, “may use its spending power to create incentives for States 
to act in accordance with federal policies.  But when ‘pressure turns 
into compulsion,’ the legislation runs contrary to our system of 
federalism,” and exceeds the scope of the Spending Clause.86  In 
other words, the issue of coercion—mentioned only in passing in 
Dole87—became the central show.88 
                                                          
(per curiam), would have found coercive the Department of Education’s threat to 
withhold IDEA sums from Virginia for failure to comply with part of the Act, that 
conclusion did not carry the day.  Id. at 560–61 (noting that only six of the thirteen 
judges on the en banc court adopted the full dissenting panel opinion of Judge 
Luttig, which included the coercion conclusion, while the remaining seven judges 
either declined to join this conclusion or dissented entirely).  Subsequent Fourth 
Circuit cases have treated the coercion doctrine as fatal in theory but toothless in 
fact.  See, e.g., West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 288–90 (acknowledging that the coercion 
theory finds some support in the Fourth Circuit but holding that there was no 
coercion in the case under consideration). 
 81. See cases cited supra notes 2–3. 
 82. See, e.g., Joondeph, supra note 5.  
 83. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) 
(plurality opinion); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (“The 
spending power is of course not unlimited, but is instead subject to several general 
restrictions articulated in our cases.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 84. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85. Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 86. Id. (citation omitted). 
 87. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12 (raising and resolving the coercion issue briefly at 
the end of the opinion, separate from the four restrictions on the spending power 
considered earlier in the opinion); see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 172 
(1992) (identifying the “four” limitations on the Spending Clause set forth in Dole); 
see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
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For the plurality, the rationale for avoiding coercion under the 
Spending Clause was rooted in respect for the states as “independent 
sovereigns in our federal system.”89  The plurality identified two 
values associated with this sovereignty.  First, “individual liberty would 
suffer” in “a system that vests power in one central government.”90  
And second, “the political accountability key to our federal system” 
would suffer if voters do not understand which government 
officials—federal or state—to blame for a particular program.91  Only 
when a state has a legitimate choice whether to accept federal funds 
and the accompanying programmatic conditions can voters hold state 
officials accountable for their choice.92 
In connecting Spending Clause conditions to these values of 
individual liberty and political accountability, the plurality newly 
presented the Spending Clause as closely aligned with the anti-
commandeering doctrine under the Tenth Amendment.  Indeed, it 
is telling that the key cases the plurality cited for its explanation of 
the limitations on the spending power were the anti-
commandeering cases of Printz v. United States93 and New York v. 
United States,94 rather than Dole.95  Dole, it bears reiterating, did not 
focus much on state sovereignty, individual liberty, or political 
accountability,96 while New York v. United States carefully 
                                                          
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (noting that the Dole Court “mentioned, 
but did not adopt,” the coercion inquiry, which had been “hypothetically raised a 
half-century earlier” in Steward Machine). 
 88. To be sure, the plaintiffs below did not challenge the Medicaid expansion 
on any ground other than coercion, see Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom., NFIB, 132 
S. Ct. 2566, but both Justice Ginsburg, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part), and 
the joint dissent, id. at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting), 
placed the coercion inquiry in the context of the Dole factors, while the plurality 
did not. 
 89. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  The plurality did not seem to consider that voters might wish to praise 
government officials for a particular program. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 94. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 95. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03; see also Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 
1203 (10th Cir. 2000) (calling Printz and New York “inapposite” to the state’s 
challenge of conditions attached to its acceptance of federal welfare funds). 
 96. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (describing a previous 
case in which the Court had found no violation of state sovereignty where a state 
could simply refuse federal funds whose accompanying conditions it did not like, and 
making no mention of individual liberty or political accountability as a concern 
under the Spending Clause). 
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distinguished commandeering from conditional spending.97  It has 
long been thought that Congress can accomplish almost anything 
with conditional spending under the Spending Clause, even when it 
cannot accomplish its goals with more direct regulation.98  The 
plurality’s articulation of spending conditions as akin to 
commandeering—an idea that the joint dissent agreed with99—
suggests a new way of looking at Congress’s spending power. 
While the plurality did not articulate a clear test for finding 
coercion or attempting to “‘fix the outermost line’ where persuasion 
gives way to coercion,”100 it is nonetheless possible to discern three 
key factors on which the plurality relied to find the Medicaid 
expansion coercive: (1) the Medicaid expansion constituted a new, 
independent program, which the states could reject only if they were 
willing to relinquish all of their funds for the older, pre-expansion 
program; (2) the states had insufficient notice that they would have 
to comply with the new program’s conditions; and (3) the states were 
“economic[ally] dragoon[ed]” into the new program by the financial 
terms of the expansion.101  According to the plurality, these factors 
had the constitutionally impermissible effect of “conscript[ing] state 
                                                          
 97. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161–67 (tracing the distinction between 
commandeering and conditional spending to the Framers’ original understanding of 
the Constitution); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 567, 616 (2011) (explaining that the anti-commandeering prohibition under 
the Tenth Amendment is the reason why Congress used the spending power to get 
the states to participate in the Affordable Care Act and Race to the Top, the Obama 
administration’s major education initiative).   
 98. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (explaining that Congress may pursue objectives 
through the use of the spending power where it may not do so under Article I’s 
enumerated powers); see also id. at 210 (“We have also held that a perceived Tenth 
Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs did not 
concomitantly limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants.”); 
Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 347 n.2 (citing articles addressing how the Court’s 
Spending Clause jurisprudence has granted Congress a sort of indirect regulatory 
power); Metzger, supra note 97, at 616–17 (explaining that federalism doctrines such 
as anti-commandeering have only limited effectiveness in restricting federal power, 
in part because of the breadth of the spending power). 
 99. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (citing New York and Printz for the proposition that spending conditions 
may violate the commandeering prohibition). 
 100. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
548, 591 (1937)). 
 101. Id. at 2603–07.  Justice Ginsburg analyzed each of these factors in turn in her 
dissent.  Id. at 2635–41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part).  I therefore do not agree with Professors Huberfeld, 
Leonard, and Outterson that “the Court has crafted little doctrine to follow.”  Nicole 
Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties:  Medicaid and Coercion in the 
Healthcare Cases, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2013) (criticizing the plurality for 
“declin[ing] to articulate any test or rubric for deciding whether a spending clause 
program crosses the coercion line” and instead presenting only “fact-specific” 
“slogans” that “provide little guidance to future courts and litigants”). 
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[agencies] into the national bureaucratic army”102 and “surely” made 
the Medicaid expansion coercive.103  In the joint dissent, Justice 
Scalia, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito focused on 
the last of these factors and agreed that the financial terms of the 
Medicaid expansion were coercive.104  Thus, while Justice Ginsburg, 
joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented from this conclusion,105 seven 
Justices held that the Medicaid expansion exceeded the scope of 
Congress’s spending power. 
Four interpretive questions about these opinions immediately 
present themselves.  First, what is the relationship among the three 
key factors in the plurality’s opinion:  Must they all be present in 
order for a law to be coercive, or does any one of them alone 
establish coercion?  Second, what is the relationship between the 
plurality opinion and the joint dissent:  Where do they overlap, where 
do they differ, and what is the likely effect of their difference?  Third, 
which opinion—the joint dissent or the plurality—is likely to provide 
the framework that lower courts will follow?  And fourth, what do the 
opinions reveal about how to determine whether a program is new 
and independent, provides insufficient notice, or constitutes 
economic dragooning? 
As to the first question, the best reading of the plurality’s opinion is 
that the three factors may not independently lead to a finding of 
coercion but instead must be tied together.  As I explain in the rest of 
this section, the three factors are properly read to operate in 
sequence:  Does the condition in question threaten to take away 
funds for a program that is separate and independent from the 
program to which the condition in question is attached?106  If so, did 
the states have sufficient notice at the time they accepted funds for 
the first program that they would also have to comply with the second 
program?107  If not, is the amount of funding at stake so significant 
that the threat to withdraw it constitutes economic dragooning?108  
This reading supports and refines into a three-part sequential test 
Professor Bagenstos’s conclusion that the plurality opinion 
establishes an “anti-leveraging principle,” under which a statute is 
                                                          
 102. Id. at 2607 (plurality opinion) (second alteration in original) (quoting FERC 
v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in 
part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
 104. Id. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 2666–67 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). 
 106. Id. at 2604 (plurality opinion). 
 107. Id. at 2606. 
 108. Id. at 2604–05. 
PASACHOFF.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2013  1:13 PM 
2013] CONDITIONAL SPENDING AFTER NFIB V. SEBELIUS 595 
unconstitutionally coercive “when Congress takes an entrenched 
federal program that provides very large sums to the states and tells 
states they can continue to participate in that program only if they 
also agree to participate in a separate and independent program.”109 
As to the second question—the relationship between the plurality 
opinion and the joint dissent—I agree with Professor Bagenstos that 
the joint dissent’s analysis would in theory raise constitutional 
questions about more statutes than the plurality’s analysis.  This is 
beause the joint dissent would focus on the size alone of a spending 
program, while the plurality would additionally examine whether 
separate programs are yoked together and the extent of notice to the 
states about this yoking.110  As my discussion in Part II indicates, 
however, I disagree with Professor Bagenstos that application of the 
joint dissent’s analysis would, in the end, “render many more 
spending conditions unconstitutional.”111  I demonstrate below that 
federal education funding, the second largest source of federal funds 
to the states, is unlikely to be deemed coercive under either the 
plurality’s or the joint dissent’s understanding of “economic 
dragooning.”  And if federal education funding is unlikely to be 
found coercive along these lines, smaller sources of federal funding 
are even less likely to be found coercive. 
As to the third question—which opinion lower courts are likely to 
follow—once more I agree with Professor Bagenstos that in a rigid, 
doctrinal sense, the plurality opinion provides “the analysis that lower 
courts will most safely follow”112 because any statute that would be 
invalidated under the narrower rationale provided by the plurality 
would also be found problematic by the four Justices in the joint 
dissent.113  But it seems to me that lower courts may well apply the 
joint dissent’s analysis in the alternative, given the lack of binding 
precedent that attaches to a plurality opinion,114 and given the 
                                                          
 109. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause 
After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128977.  I share Professor Bagenstos’s views that this 
reading of the plurality’s opinion further produces a test for coercion that is 
normatively superior to a test that would find coercion where any one of the factors 
is present in isolation.  See id. (manuscript at 11–42).  However, as the normative 
aspect of this analysis is not important for the purposes of my project—which instead 
is to try to make sense of the two alternate tests and apply them faithfully to the area 
where the challenges seem most likely to loom next—I refer readers interested in 
that aspect to Professor Bagenstos’s article. 
 110. Id. (manuscript at 5–6). 
 111. Id. (manuscript at 5). 
 112. Id. (manuscript at 6). 
 113. Id. (manuscript at 5–6 & n.17) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 
195 (1977)). 
 114. Id. (manuscript at 6 n.17); see also Huberfeld et al., supra note 101, at 36 & n.236 
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possibility that NFIB is merely the opening salvo in a revitalized 
coercion inquiry.115  It is therefore important to provide guidance to 
the lower courts on how to apply the joint dissent, and in particular, 
to show how even the joint dissent would not jeopardize as many laws 
as one might think on an initial read. 
Finally, it is to the fourth question I now turn:  how to understand 
and extract guidance from the facts that the plurality and joint 
dissent found compelling in their coercion analysis.  What indicators 
mattered?  What indicators were deemed irrelevant?  And given this 
analysis, what opportunities and vulnerabilities present themselves to 
litigants seeking to make or defend against a challenge of coercion?  
As I unpack these indicators and explain how best to read each factor, 
I show at the same time how the three factors should be read together. 
1. Old funding conditioned on compliance with a new program 
The plurality began by distinguishing between two types of 
spending conditions that Congress might conceivably impose:  
conditions on the use of federal funds and conditions that threaten 
to take away federal funds for other programs.116  According to the 
plurality, the former is constitutionally permissible: “We have upheld 
Congress’s authority to condition the receipt of funds on the States’ 
complying with restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is 
the means by which Congress ensures that the funds are spent 
according to its view of the ‘general Welfare.’”117  In contrast, the 
latter is constitutionally suspect: “Conditions that do not here govern 
the use of the funds, however, cannot be justified on that basis.  
When, for example, such conditions take the form of threats to 
terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are 
properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy 
changes.”118 
One could question whether the offered justification for this 
distinction makes sense.  At some level, imposing conditions on the 
use of federal funds could also be seen as “pressuring the States to 
accept policy changes.”119  For example, if the federal government 
offers a grant that is designed to pay for standardized tests taken by 
                                                          
(noting that plurality decisions are “notoriously difficult to interpret” and cause confusion 
for lower courts). 
 115. See Huberfeld et al., supra note 101, at 50 (suggesting that NFIB’s Spending 
Clause analysis represents “a launch, not a landing”). 
 116. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–05 (2012) 
(plurality opinion). 
 117. Id. at 2603–04. 
 118. Id. at 2604. 
 119. Id. 
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students in certain grades, that grant is also a way of pressuring states 
to administer standardized tests in those grades.  By the same token, 
the federal government could reasonably believe that tying together 
separate and independent programs is the best way to promote the 
general welfare.  For example, Congress might want to require states 
currently accepting funds for elementary and secondary education to 
also accept a new grant for preschool programs or lose the old grant, 
on the theory that the general welfare is best served by integrating 
preschool and subsequent education. 120 
But setting these questions aside and taking the plurality’s 
distinction at face value, three points become apparent.  First, the 
plurality did not challenge at any fundamental level Congress’s ability 
to impose conditions on a source of funding.121  That is clear from its 
explanation that tying such conditions to funding permits Congress 
to effectuate the general welfare.122  To make the point more directly: 
“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds 
under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health 
care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the 
conditions on their use.”123  Existing laws (or future laws) that simply 
impose conditions on the use of program funds are therefore not 
jeopardized by the plurality’s holding. 
Second, the plurality indicated that the size of a spending program 
cannot itself trigger a finding of coercion.124  As the plurality 
suggested by imposing no spending cap in its discussion of how 
Congress achieves the general welfare, where conditions govern the 
use of funds, the conditions are not coercive, no matter the size of 
the funds.  The plurality gave no impression that it found the large 
sums involved with pre-ACA Medicaid problematic, as the conditions 
associated with those funds governed the use of those funds.  
Similarly, the plurality gave no impression that it found the large 
sums offered to expand Medicaid problematic, as long as those sums 
were conditioned on their use and not the use of other funds.  For 
the plurality, then, the size of a spending program is relevant for 
                                                          
 120. Bagenstos, supra note 109 (manuscript at 46). 
 121. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–02 (plurality opinion). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 2607; see also id. at 2603 (“Congress may attach appropriate conditions 
to federal taxing and spending programs to preserve its control over the use of 
federal funds.”). 
 124. See id. at 2601–02 (emphasizing the nature, not the amount, of the spending 
to find it coercive).  The joint dissent did not agree on this point, as I discuss shortly.  
See infra Part I.C.3. 
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coercion purposes only where a condition threatens to terminate 
“other significant independent grants.”125 
Third, the plurality did not suggest that coercion is apparent 
whenever “significant independent grants” are threatened.  Instead, 
because “conditions [that] take the form of threats to terminate 
other significant independent grants . . . are properly viewed as a 
means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes,”126 such a 
threat merely prompts an inquiry into “whether ‘the financial 
inducement offered by Congress’ [is] ‘so coercive as to pass the point 
at which pressure turns into compulsion.’”127  Take, for example, the 
plurality’s analysis of Dole.  The plurality acknowledged that the 
condition at stake in Dole “was not a restriction on how the highway 
funds . . . were to be used,” but rather a threat to terminate the 
independent grant of highway funds.128  For the plurality, that threat 
triggered the Dole Court’s analysis of whether the threat was 
significant enough to be deemed coercive, but did not require a 
finding that it was.129 
Under the plurality’s analysis, then, the first element for a finding 
of coercion is that a “significant independent” grant is threatened.  
The next question then becomes how to determine whether a grant is 
“significant” and “independent.”  I explain how to determine if a 
grant is financially significant below in my discussion of “economic 
dragooning,”130 but turn to the determination of a grant’s 
independence now. 
Sometimes the independence of a grant will be obvious.  There is 
no doubt that Medicaid itself is a separate and independent program 
from No Child Left Behind, for example.  But where it is less clear 
whether a condition is merely a modification to an existing program 
or a new and independent program, the plurality’s analysis of why it 
placed the Medicaid expansion into the latter category provides some 
guidelines. 
                                                          
 125. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (plurality opinion). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  Note that this is a separate inquiry from whether the condition is 
germane or related to the federal interest in the program, one of Dole’s 
requirements.  The plurality did not suggest that the Medicaid expansion was not 
germane to Medicaid funding, just as it did not disavow the Dole Court’s conclusion 
that the drinking age was germane to federal highway funding.  For the plurality, 
then, a program can be germane and yet nonetheless separate and independent. 
 130. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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First, unlike previous modifications to the program, the Medicaid 
expansion constituted “a shift in kind, not merely degree”131: 
The original program was designed to cover medical services for 
four particular categories of the needy:  the disabled, the blind, 
the elderly, and needy families with dependent children.  
Previous amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely altered and 
expanded the boundaries of these categories.  Under the 
Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to 
meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population 
with income below 133 percent of the poverty level.  It is no 
longer a program to care for the neediest among us, but rather 
an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal 
health insurance coverage.132 
To be sure, whether something will qualify as a shift in kind rather 
than degree is not entirely straightforward, and one could well 
challenge the plurality’s understanding of Medicaid’s categories and 
history as it applied this inquiry in NFIB.133  But to say that this 
analysis provides no guidance to litigants, courts, or Congress is not 
accurate.  The more a statutory change can be said to “merely alter[]” 
or “expand[] the boundaries” of previously existing statutory 
categories, the more likely it is that the change works no shift in 
kind.134  On the other hand, the more a statutory change can be said 
to “transform” a program by exploding the concept of statutory 
categories or by making those statutory categories so broad that they 
start to become “comprehensive” or “universal,” the more likely it is 
that the change is a shift in kind rather than degree.135  Courts make 
assessments about where an action falls along a spectrum of 
interpretive possibility all the time.136 
Second, and in my view more importantly, the plurality took very 
seriously the idea that the basic contours of the pre-ACA Medicaid—
                                                          
 131. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion). 
 132. Id. at 2605–06 (citation omitted). 
 133. See id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the plurality’s interpretation of the 
history and structure of Medicaid); Huberfeld et al., supra note 101, at 13–29, 75–86 
(discussing the history of Medicaid and arguing that the plurality’s understanding of 
this history was incorrect). 
 134. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
 135. Id. 
 136. For example, the questions of whether government action results in 
“excessive entanglement” with religion under the First Amendment, see Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971), whether an action “shocks the conscience” for 
due process purposes, see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998), or 
whether a federal statute enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
“congruent and proportional” to violations of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 548 (2004), all have a similar flavor. 
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what it called “existing Medicaid”—remained in place, while the 
ACA’s expansion of Medicaid was an addition on top of the old 
program, not a wholesale replacement of the old program.137  In 
other words, it is not that the ACA transformed the entire Medicaid 
program that made the Medicaid expansion “independent”—it is that 
“existing Medicaid” stayed on the books while the expansion, as 
appended to “existing Medicaid,” was so large as to become itself an 
independent program.  The second indicator as to whether a 
modification is actually an independent program is thus whether the 
underlying, pre-modification program remains intact. 
The third and fourth indicators of an independent program 
identified by the plurality strike me as sufficient but not necessary 
under the plurality’s reading:  whether “Congress created a separate 
funding provision to cover the costs of” the modification and whether 
“[t]he conditions on use of the different funds are also distinct” from 
the conditions placed on the pre-modification program.138  These 
indicators are likely sufficient because separate funding and distinct 
conditions suggest that the modification could itself be a stand-alone 
program.  But they are not necessary.  As a matter of interpretation, 
the plurality offered these two indicators as supporting, not 
establishing, its conclusion that the Medicaid expansion was a new 
program.139  Moreover, the plurality agreed that the condition in Dole 
was imposed on a separate, independent program, and there were no 
new funds attached to that condition.140  And as a matter of logic, it is 
difficult to see how the absence of these indicators would undermine 
the plurality’s reliance on the “shift in kind” and on the continued 
existence of the pre-modification program.  In other words, had 
Congress not provided separate funding for the Medicaid expansion 
and had instead made the conditions of the Medicaid expansion 
match the conditions on the pre-ACA Medicaid, it would not have 
diminished the argument that the expansion was so transformative 
that, layered on top of the still-existing pre-ACA Medicaid, it 
constituted a new and independent program. 
2. Notice to the states 
Once it has been determined that a condition does not govern the 
use of the funds in question but rather threatens to terminate 
                                                          
 137. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (“Indeed, the manner in which the expansion is structured indicates that 
while Congress may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, 
it recognized it was enlisting the States in a new health care program.”). 
 140. Id. at 2604. 
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another independent program, the next question under the 
plurality’s analysis is whether the states had notice at the time they 
first accepted funding under the first program that they would also 
have to comply with the second program.141  If the states had proper 
notice of this tying condition at the start, the condition would not be 
coercive under the plurality’s reading, for the “legitimacy of 
Congress’s exercise of the spending power ‘thus rests on whether the 
State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract.’”142  
If the states did not have proper notice, then the question becomes 
whether the terms of the financial inducement constitute economic 
dragooning. 
Justice Ginsburg took the plurality to say that “States must be able 
to foresee, when they sign up, alterations Congress might make later 
on.”143  In her view, the plurality’s references to “existing” or “pre-
existing” Medicaid at the same time as it rejected the ACA’s 
expansion “limit[ed] Congress’ authority to alter its spending 
programs.”144  She rightly explained that such an interpretation ran 
counter to longstanding precedent.145  If this broad reading were 
what the plurality meant, then the regulatory state would indeed be 
in jeopardy, since Congress periodically reauthorizes and modifies its 
spending programs as a matter of course in ways that are not 
previewed in the original legislation.146  If reservation of “the right to 
alter, amend, or repeal” any provision of Medicaid did not provide the 
requisite notice about the Medicaid expansion, as the plurality held it 
did not,147 then, under Justice Ginsburg’s understanding of the 
plurality, states would essentially have the right to freeze the design of a 
spending program and Congress’s hands would be tied with respect to 
modification.148 
Justice Ginsburg’s alarmist reading of the plurality’s notice 
requirement, however, is not an accurate one.  The plurality’s notice 
                                                          
 141. Id. at 2606–07. 
 142. Id. at 2602 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 
17 (1981)). 
 143. Id. at 2637 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in 
part, and dissenting in part). 
 144. Id. at 2641. 
 145. Id. at 2638–39 (citing Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. 
Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986); Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985); Bennett 
v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 146. See id. at 2639 (discussing previous alterations to the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program). 
 147. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
 148. Id. at 2638–39 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). 
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requirement hinged on its conclusion that the Medicaid expansion 
was a separate program from the pre-ACA Medicaid.149  The allusions 
to existing and pre-existing Medicaid referred to the fact that the pre-
ACA version of Medicaid was still on the books.150  These references 
are better seen merely as a way of distinguishing the pre-ACA version 
of Medicaid, with its still-specified program design and funding, from 
the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid, with its new specifications and new 
funding, and not as any limitation on Congress’s authority to alter its 
spending programs.151  As the plurality explained, the states may have 
agreed, in taking pre-ACA Medicaid funds, that Congress could 
“alter, amend, or repeal any provision,” but nothing in this language 
indicated that Congress could “enlist[] the States in a new health care 
program” as a condition of receiving those funds.152  The notice the 
plurality actually required, then, is not notice of any change to the 
program Congress might make in the future, but notice that the 
states would have to participate in a separate, independent program 
if they want to participate in the first program. 
Justice Ginsburg’s reading would not square with the plurality’s 
explanation that Congress may “offer[] funds . . . to expand the 
availability of health care, and requir[e] that States accepting such 
funds comply with the conditions on their use,”153 in keeping with 
what the plurality recognized as Congress’s right to “ensure[] that the 
funds are spent according to its view of the ‘general Welfare.’”154  As I 
explained in the previous section, the plurality would find no 
coercion when Congress merely places conditions on the use of 
funds.155  The plurality did not indicate that Congress may place 
conditions on a program only at the time the program is first 
implemented. 
That the plurality cannot have meant Justice Ginsburg’s reading is 
also clear from its treatment of earlier revisions to Medicaid.  If the 
plurality really meant that states must be able to foresee any change 
Congress might make to a program at the moment they first accept 
funds for it, the plurality would have presumably had some difficulty 
with the “[p]revious amendments to Medicaid eligibility,” which 
                                                          
 149. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
 150. Id. at 2601. 
 151. See id. (comparing “existing Medicaid,” which covered certain needy groups 
before the Medicaid expansion, with the expansion, which covers all individuals 
below 133% of the poverty line). 
 152. Id. at 2605–06 (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. at 2607. 
 154. Id. at 2603–04. 
 155. See supra part I.B.1. 
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“altered and expanded the boundaries of [the original] categories” 
set forth in 1965.156  Such alterations and expansions would not have 
been foreseeable when the states originally accepted funds under 
Medicaid, given the contours of the original eligibility categories, and 
yet the plurality did not object.157 
The same is true for the plurality’s treatment of the statute at issue 
in Dole.  That statute was an amendment to the Surface 
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982.158  There is no chance that 
when states took funds under that Act in 1982 they could have 
foreseen that a 1984 law would require them to raise their drinking 
age or lose some funding under the Act.  Yet the plurality did not 
conclude that the subsequent amendment was therefore coercive.159 
The distinction between these two examples—previous 
amendments to Medicaid and the amendment at issue in Dole—helps 
elucidate the effect of the plurality’s notice requirement.  Notice at 
the time the state first accepts funding under a program that two 
programs will be tied together should end the coercion inquiry,160 but 
the absence of such notice does not mean that the condition is 
coercive; it simply means that the coercion inquiry should proceed to 
the third stage, asking whether the financial inducements are so 
significant as to constitute economic dragooning.161  For the plurality, 
previous amendments to Medicaid were merely modifications on the 
use of Medicaid funds, not the creation of a separate program, and 
were therefore not coercive at the first stage of the analysis.  However, 
because the condition at issue in Dole did threaten to remove funds 
from a separate program, the plurality considered the second stage of 
the analysis.  Finding no notice at the time the states first accepted 
highway funds that this independent condition would also be 
required, the plurality nonetheless did not conclude at this second 
stage that the condition was coercive.  Instead, the plurality went on 
to examine the scope of the financial inducement under the third 
stage of analysis.  The plurality’s notice requirement therefore 
                                                          
 156. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Act of July 17, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, sec. 6(a), § 158, 98 Stat. 435, 437. 
 159. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (plurality opinion). 
 160. Thus, under the facts in Dole, had the original 1982 Transportation Act 
included the requirement that states accepting funds under the Act would have to 
raise their drinking age, presumably the plurality’s notice requirement would have 
been satisfied because the states would have had full notice of the requirement to 
participate in an independent program at the moment they first decided whether to 
accept the funds in question. 
 161. See infra part I.B.3 (explaining when economic dragooning occurs). 
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determines whether the coercion analysis stops at the second stage or 
proceeds to the third; it does not provide a final answer itself. 
The plurality introduces one distinction between the notice 
required of conditions that tie together two independent programs 
and the notice that is typically required of Spending Clause 
conditions.  Whereas most Spending Clause conditions must provide 
adequate notice at the time they are imposed, even if that is years 
after the original legislation was passed,162 the notice the plurality 
required of tying conditions comes earlier in time, at the moment 
states first accept funds under a program.163  This distinction fits with 
the plurality’s concern that tying conditions are meant to “pressur[e] 
the States to accept policy changes” and therefore deserve closer 
scrutiny.164  If a state knows at the time it accepts funds for a program 
that it will also have to comply with the terms of another program, it 
can understand the choice before it and make its own decisions.165  
But if a state understands that it must comply with the terms only of 
the program for which it is accepting funds (even knowing that those 
terms may change), and only later learns that it must take on the 
conditions of the new program if it wants to retain funds under the 
old program, its ability to make a knowing choice is compromised.  It 
is in that sense that condition that ties two programs together once a 
state is already deeply entrenched in the first program is a “post-
acceptance” or “retroactive” condition.166  “A State could hardly 
anticipate that Congress’s reservation of the right to ‘alter’ or 
‘amend’ the Medicaid program included the power to transform it so 
dramatically,” by adding “a new health care program” on top of 
“existing Medicaid.”167  But a notice provision that tied Medicaid to 
another program when the states first accepted money under 
Medicaid in 1965 would not face this difficulty. 
The plurality did not explain what would constitute sufficient 
notice of a tying condition, but the typical clear statement rule 
applicable in Spending Clause cases would seem to apply:  what “a 
state official would clearly understand” about the obligations imposed 
                                                          
 162. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295–
97 (2006) (considering notice requirement as to provision added in 1986 to 
legislation originally passed in 1975). 
 163. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
 164. Id. at 2604. 
 165. This would be a paradigmatic example of the plurality’s dramatic explanation 
that “[t]he States are separate and independent sovereigns.  Sometimes they have to 
act like it.”  Id. at 2603. 
 166. Id. at 2606. 
 167. Id. 
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by the Act.168  One can certainly argue about the value or meaning of 
this rule,169 but read properly, the plurality’s opinion did not expand 
the notice requirement in any way that meaningfully disrupts 
Congress’s ability to modify Spending Clause legislation. 
3. Economic dragooning 
The last part of the plurality’s coercion analysis is that Congress 
may not offer “financial inducement” that constitutes “economic 
dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to 
acquiesce.”170  As I have just explained, the plurality would reach this 
question only if the condition in question threatened to take away 
funds from an independent program and if that condition were 
added after the states first joined the original program.171  However, 
the joint dissent would start here. 
Initial responses to the issue of economic dragooning have 
suggested that the plurality and joint dissent provide no real signposts 
for how to determine when such dragooning exists.172  That is not 
entirely accurate.  It is possible to draw out facts that the opinions 
found relevant and irrelevant, thereby highlighting the proper focus 
for future spending challenges. 
First, the effect of the federal funding on the state budget is key.  The 
plurality and joint dissent agreed that the threat of losing over 10% of 
a state’s overall budget, the percentage that federal Medicaid funding 
represented, could not be sustained.173  The plurality made this 
calculation by noting that 20% of the average state’s budget goes to 
Medicaid payments, with the federal government covering 50% to 
83% of those payments.174  The joint dissent emphasized that 
Medicaid spending constitutes the greatest line item in the average 
state’s budget, the federal government pays for almost two-thirds of 
                                                          
 168. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006).   
 169. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 403–08 (critiquing the rule); Brian Galle, 
Getting Spending:  How To Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About 
Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 156–57 (2004) (same); 
Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for States 
in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 446 (2008) (same). 
 170. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion). 
 171. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the relationship between coercion and notice 
to the states). 
 172. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2640–41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the 
plurality and joint dissent raise more questions than they answer); Huberfeld et al., 
supra note 101, at 5–6 (lamenting that neither the plurality nor the joint dissent 
articulated a clear test for future courts to follow). 
 173. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (plurality opinion); id. at 2662–63 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 174. Id. at 2604 (plurality opinion). 
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all Medicaid spending, most states receive over $1 billion annually in 
Medicaid funds, and a quarter of all states receive over $5 billion 
annually in Medicaid funds.175 
Both the plurality and joint dissent contrasted the percentage of 
the budget affected here with the percentage of state budgets 
affected in Dole.  As the plurality explained, “[i]t is easy to see how the 
Dole Court could conclude that the threatened loss of less than half of 
one percent of South Dakota’s budget left that State with a 
‘prerogative’ to reject Congress’s desired policy, ‘not merely in theory 
but in fact.’”176  For its part, the joint dissent called the amount at 
issue for South Dakota “less than 1% of its annual state 
expenditures,” noted that the total amount of federal funding 
jeopardized in Dole constituted 0.19% of all state expenditures 
combined, and agreed with the Dole Court that the threat to withhold 
that amount “is aptly characterized as ‘relatively mild 
encouragement.’”177  For both the plurality and joint dissent, then, 
financial inducement crosses the line to coercion when the 
threatened loss is somewhere between less than 1% and as much as 
10% of a state’s overall annual expenditures. 
The plurality’s inquiry into the effect on the state budget was 
largely retrospective.  In other words, the plurality focused on the 
economic dragooning inherent in taking away a sum of money on 
which states had come to rely, not on whether any future offer of 
independent funds would constitute economic dragooning.  This 
inquiry makes sense from the perspective of the sequence in which 
the plurality considered the question of coercion.  Because 
conditions that govern the use of funds are, for the plurality, 
constitutionally permissible no matter their size, and because the 
question of notice looks back to when the states originally signed on 
to a program, the plurality’s focus for economic dragooning was 
properly on the threat of losing funds that states had otherwise 
expected for the state budget—that is, a retrospective evaluation of 
economic dragooning. 
The joint dissent’s focus on state budgets was broader.  The joint 
dissent agreed with the plurality that the threat to withdraw federal 
funds could be so large as to constitute economic dragooning, but 
the joint dissent also expressed the belief that an offer of federal 
                                                          
 175. Id. at 2662–63 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 176. Id. at 2604 (plurality opinion) (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 
211–12 (1987)). 
 177. Id. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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funding could ab initio be so large as to be coercive.178  From the 
joint dissent’s perspective, both the amount of federal funds offered 
and the extent of the federal tax burden on a state’s citizens are 
relevant to the question of whether a state has a real (rather than a 
theoretical) ability to turn down an offer of federal funds from the 
start.179  Under this view, the larger the program, and the more taxes 
citizens must pay to support it, the less likely the states will feel able to 
turn down the funds, because, according to the joint dissent, there is 
a practical limitation to how much citizens are able and willing to pay 
in their overall combined tax burden.180  Taxpayers whose heavy 
federal taxes would go to support the federal program in question in 
other states might not also be able to pay whatever state taxes would 
be needed to fund a state-run version of the program.181  In such 
circumstances, the joint dissent would find coercion.182 
After the effect of the challenged conditional spending program 
on the state budget, whether retrospective or prospective, the 
plurality and joint dissent both focused on the percentage of the federal 
program’s funding at stake.  States that did not want to sign on to the 
Medicaid expansion faced the possibility of losing 100% of their 
Medicaid funds183—not, as in Dole, “a relatively small percentage” of 
the funds in question.184 
                                                          
 178. Id. at 2666. 
 179. See id. at 2661–62. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 2663.  In explaining this point, the joint dissent implicitly rejected the 
assessment of several lower courts and commentators that because the states have 
sovereign taxing authority and can—in principle—raise whatever funds they need, 
no offer of federal funds can actually be coercive.  See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding 
that the Medicaid expansion was not coercive because a state can create its own 
program if it rejects Congress’s conditions), rev’d sub nom. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566; 
Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 881–82 (2008) (arguing 
that there is no evidence that states are unable to raise funds equivalent to federal 
program funds).  That the joint dissent did not engage with this alternative 
assessment provides an opening for future litigants defending a conditional spending 
program to argue that the factual premise underlying the joint dissent’s conclusion is 
wrong.  Recent work by Professor Galle, for example, provides empirical evidence 
that federal taxes do not actually crowd out state taxes; instead, “federal revenues 
increase both state revenues and state revenue as a fraction of available state wealth.”  
See Brian Galle, Does Federal Spending “Coerce” States?  Evidence from State Budgets, 107 
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6, 37, 46–56), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150721 (finding that research favors the “crowd in” 
theory and arguing that, contrary to common belief, state revenues rise when federal 
revenues rise). 
 183. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (plurality opinion). 
 184. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (noting that the amount at stake 
was “5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs”). 
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Could a finding of economic dragooning exist where only a high 
percentage of the funding for a federal program is at stake and yet 
the overall amount at stake is relatively small?  Neither opinion 
explicitly answers this question, but I think it likely that it is instead 
the percentage of the state budget at stake that controls.  Given the 
plurality and joint dissent’s shared focus on the bottom line for state 
budgets, it is hard to see how a loss of 100% of a small federal grant 
could constitute economic dragooning.  How, after all, would that 
threaten state sovereignty?  At the same time, if only 5% of the 
Medicaid grant were at stake—the same percentage at issue in 
Dole185—the plurality and joint dissent would have confronted a much 
less dramatic effect on the state budget. 
What is clear from both opinions is that agency discretion in 
determining the actual amount of a cut-off or whether to impose any 
cut-off at all for noncompliance does not matter.186  What matters is 
the statutory possibility that 100% of the funds could be at stake. 
The last relevant detail for the plurality was the extent of 
administrative entrenchment.  As the plurality explained as part of its 
reasoning for finding economic dragooning, “the States have 
developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the 
course of many decades to implement their objectives under existing 
Medicaid.”187  Although the plurality did not explore this observation 
further, the idea presumably is that the extent of the resources states 
have committed to the “existing” program contributes to trapping the 
states into continuing with the program when it changes, because it 
would be too costly to unwind those resources and commit them to a 
different, state-run program. 
The plurality and joint dissent both treated as immaterial the 
amount of federal funding offered to offset the state share of a cooperative 
program.188  As the plurality explained somewhat wryly, “It is not 
unheard of . . . for the federal government to increase requirements 
in such a manner as to impose unfunded mandates on the States.”189  
The joint dissent agreed that a currently high percentage of federal 
contributions cannot always be counted on.190 
                                                          
 185. Id. 
 186. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006) (granting the Secretary “discretion” to limit or cut 
off Medicaid funds entirely); cf. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 n.27 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) 
(emphasizing that the Secretary can, but does not have to, withhold all Medicaid 
funding for noncompliance). 
 187. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (plurality opinion). 
 188. Id. at 2605 n.12. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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But the plurality and joint dissent disagreed about whether the 
amount of the state contribution has any bearing on the question of 
economic dragooning.  The plurality indicated that the size of the 
state’s contribution is irrelevant: “‘Your money or your life’ is a 
coercive proposition, whether you have a single dollar in your pocket 
or $500.”191  For the joint dissent, however, it was relevant that the 
Medicaid expansion would impose substantial costs on the states, on 
the order of many tens of billions of dollars a year in substantive and 
administrative costs.192  The joint dissent did not indicate that an 
increase in state costs could, on its own, constitute coercion, although 
it noted that the increase in state costs undercut the government’s 
argument that the financial terms of the Medicaid expansion were 
“exceedingly generous.”193 
The joint dissent offered two other rationales for its conclusion 
that the Medicaid expansion was coercive.  The joint dissent pointed 
to the broader implications of losing federal Medicaid funds because 
of the extent of intertwined funding with other programs.194  Some other 
large federal funding programs, such as welfare payments, depend on 
Medicaid eligibility, so those other funding sources might be lost if 
Medicaid funding were withdrawn.195  In addition, federal law 
requires hospitals receiving federal funds to provide certain care for 
indigent patients, care that is now typically paid for by Medicaid.196  If 
Medicaid were no longer available in a state, hospitals would find it 
very difficult to treat indigent patients in compliance with federal law 
unless the state contributed substantially.197  For the joint dissent, 
these broader implications underscored the coercion inherent in the 
expansion because the amount of money threatened was even larger 
than Medicaid funding alone. 
Additionally, for the joint dissent, the goal and structure of the program 
indicated Congress’s belief that no state could refuse the offer.198  Without the 
Medicaid expansion in place in every state, the ACA’s goal of 
providing a minimum level of coverage for everyone would be 
jeopardized, explained the joint dissent.199  And yet despite this fact, 
Congress provided no backup plan on the chance that any states 
                                                          
 191. Id. at 2605 n.12 (plurality opinion). 
 192. Id. at 2665–66 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 2663. 
 195. Id. at 2664 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3) (2006)). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd). 
 198. Id. at 2664–65. 
 199. Id. 
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declined to participate in the expansion.200  The joint dissent inferred 
that Congress thought no backup plan would be needed because all 
of the states would feel compelled to join the new plan.201  The 
structure of the Act therefore underscored the coercion in the 
program for the joint dissent. 
Two additional strands of analysis from the joint dissent are worthy 
of note.  The joint dissent seemed to suggest several times that 
litigants seeking to establish coercion face a heightened burden of proof, 
stating that “[w]hether federal spending legislation crosses the line 
from enticement to coercion is often difficult to determine, and 
courts should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional on this 
ground unless the coercive nature of an offer is unmistakably clear.”202  
This suggestion was echoed elsewhere: “The question whether a law 
enacted under the spending power is coercive in fact will sometimes 
be difficult, but where Congress has plainly crossed the line 
distinguishing encouragement from coercion, a federal program that 
coopts the States’ political processes must be declared 
unconstitutional.”203  And in explaining its conclusion, the joint 
dissent asserted, “[i]n this case . . . there can be no doubt” that “[i]f 
the anticoercion rule does not apply in this case, then there is no 
such rule.”204 
The joint dissent also seemed to suggest the need to be particularly 
solicitous of the question of financial coercion with respect to policy “in areas 
traditionally governed primarily at the state or local level.”205  As its prime 
example of the evils associated with coercion, the joint dissent 
offered a hypothetical related to education law.  Imagine a situation 
in which the federal government were to offer 
each State a grant equal to the State’s entire annual expenditures 
for primary and secondary education . . . with conditions governing 
such things as school curriculum, the hiring and tenure of 
teachers, the drawing of school districts, the length and hours of 
the school day, the school calendar, a dress code for students, and 
rules for student discipline.206 
Citizens of a state that turned down the money would not only have 
to continue to pay enough state taxes to support their state education 
                                                          
 200. Id. at 2665. 
 201. Id. at 2666. 
 202. Id. at 2662 (emphasis added). 
 203. Id. at 2661 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 204. Id. at 2662 (emphasis added). 
 205. Id. (emphasis added). 
 206. Id. 
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programs but would also have to pay the federal taxes needed to fund 
this program in states that accepted the money.207  At the same time, 
for a state that accepted the federal money, “the State and its 
subdivisions would surrender their traditional authority in the field of 
education.”208  As a matter of law, the joint dissent agreed, the state 
could turn down the money.  However, as a matter of fact, the states 
would be trapped between what the joint dissent viewed as an 
untenable choice between unfair and burdensome taxation on the 
one hand and relinquishing control over the boundaries of a core 
sovereign function on the other.209  Under such factual 
circumstances, the joint dissent would find coercion. 
It is important to understand the limits of this point.  The joint 
dissent did not suggest that coercion exists any time the federal 
government offers money for a program related to matters of 
traditional state concern.  Such a move would return the Court to the 
now-abandoned regime of National League of Cities v. Usery,210 which 
held that the Tenth Amendment precluded Congress from 
interfering with “integral” or “traditional” state activities211—an idea 
overruled as unworkable more than three decades ago.212  Instead, 
the joint dissent’s concern is best read as focusing on the size of the 
money offered and the effect on the state budget.  It is no mistake 
that the hypothetical sum of money offered by the federal 
government in the example is an amount equivalent to the state’s 
annual education expenditures (which joins Medicaid as the states’ 
other largest budget item).213  The joint dissent explained that the 
real problem with the example is that if a state turned down the offer, 
“its residents would not only be required to pay the federal taxes 
                                                          
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 211. Id. at 852. 
 212. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) 
(overruling National League of Cities); see also Ryan, supra note 76, at 46 (discussing the 
overruling of National League of Cities).  Professor Metzger accurately notes that the 
NFIB opinions do not mention Garcia.  Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To 
Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 98 (2012).  Whereas Garcia relied on the political 
safeguards of federalism to protect state interests, 469 U.S. at 552, the NFIB opinions 
take seriously the judicial role in policing the limits of federal power, Metzger, supra, 
at 98.  Yet although the NFIB plurality and joint dissent take this perceived obligation 
seriously, neither roots the analysis in the subject matter of Congress’s attention, 
focusing instead on the mechanisms by which Congress acts.  The failure to cite 
Garcia, then, does not suggest a repudiation of its key insight that a rule limiting 
federal power that “turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular 
governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional’” to state operations is “unsound in 
principle and unworkable in practice.”  469 U.S. at 546–47. 
 213. See infra note 452. 
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needed to support this expensive new program, but they would also 
be forced to pay an equivalent amount in state taxes.”214  Again, for 
the joint dissent, the size of the program is crucial:  “When a heavy 
federal tax is levied to support a federal program that offers large 
grants to the States, States may, as a practical matter, be unable to 
refuse to participate in the federal program and to substitute a state 
alternative.”215  It may be worth paying special attention when the 
federal government is offering funds that affect an area of traditional 
state concern, then, but the effect of the federal funding at stake on 
the state fisc remains the key factor for the joint dissent. 
II. COERCION AND FEDERAL EDUCATION LAW 
In the previous Part, I offered a reading of the plurality’s opinion 
that ties together different strands of logic into a three-part 
sequential test:  First, does the condition in question threaten to take 
away funds for a program that is separate and independent from the 
program to which the condition in question is attached?  Second, if it 
does, did the states have sufficient notice at the time they accepted 
funds for the first program that they would also have to comply with 
the second program?  Third and finally, if not, is the amount of 
funding at stake so significant that the threat to withdraw it 
constitutes economic dragooning?  I then demonstrated how to assess 
whether each of these parts is satisfied by drawing on and then 
abstracting from the facts about the Medicaid expansion that the 
plurality found either important or irrelevant.  For the third factor, 
economic dragooning—the centerpiece of the joint dissent—I 
showed where the plurality and the joint dissent overlapped in 
establishing economic dragooning and where they differed. 
In this Part, I now take this analysis and apply it to federal 
education funding, the next largest use of federal money to the states 
after Medicaid.  This application provides one way to test the limits of 
NFIB’s coercion analysis.  If the federal education laws seem likely to 
wither under this examination, then the fate of the Medicaid 
expansion may well be the tip of the iceberg, the first domino about 
to topple a long line of funding programs.  As this Part shows, 
however, the federal education laws should survive this examination, 
whether under the plurality’s test or under the joint dissent’s analysis. 
The rest of this Part examines in turn the major federal education 
laws:  first the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, currently 
                                                          
 214. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 215. Id. at 2661 (emphasis added). 
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reauthorized as No Child Left Behind; next the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act; and finally a series of laws that apply 
wherever federal education funding exists, including various civil 
rights laws, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, and a law 
providing for the celebration of Constitution Day.  Each of the 
following three sections first provides a brief background to the 
law(s) at issue and then applies both the NFIB plurality’s coercion 
analysis and that of the joint dissent.  I conclude that each law 
survives this analysis and therefore argue that the laws will not be 
found coercive. 
Because federal education funding is second only to Medicaid, this 
examination of federal education law leads to a much broader 
conclusion about the future of conditional spending in the regulatory 
state after NFIB.  Far from being the tip of the iceberg or the first in a 
long line of dominoes, the fate of the Medicaid expansion is more 
likely “limited to present circumstances.”216 
A. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
1. Background and history of coercion analysis 
Like Medicaid,217 the ESEA was passed in 1965 as part of the War 
on Poverty, President Johnson’s Great Society legislation that 
transformed the role of the federal government in social welfare 
programs and beyond.218  While the federal government had long 
been involved in funding a variety of targeted educational 
programs—from land grants in the 19th century to vocational 
education in the early 20th century to science education in the mid-
20th century—the ESEA represented a massive expansion in scope, 
almost immediately providing funding to nearly every school district 
around the country, with accompanying conditions placed on the use 
of the funds.219  The ESEA has been reauthorized eight times since 
1965,220 most recently in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001221 
                                                          
 216. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam). 
 217. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 218. For background on the rationales for and programs in the War on Poverty, 
see generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE:  A SOCIAL HISTORY 
OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 262–69 (1996); and JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE 
AGAINST POVERTY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 122–37 (2000). 
 219. See, e.g., Michael W. Kirst, Turning Points:  A History of American School Governance, 
in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?, supra note 76, at 14, 18–23; see also Paula S. Fass, Before 
Legalism:  The New Deal and American Education, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS:  THE 
LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF EDUCATION 22–44 (David L. Kirp & Donald N. 
Jensen eds., 1986). 
 220. DEBRAY, supra note 20, at 7. 
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(NCLB), which itself significantly increased both federal funding and 
requirements.222  While the original legislation came directly from the 
White House, with little input coming from Congress, much less the 
states,223 Congress and the states have been very involved with all 
subsequent iterations.224 
The ESEA consists of a wide variety of education programs, 
including programs supporting the education of homeless225 and 
migrant children226 as well as English language learners,227 promoting 
technology228 and drug-free schools,229 and improving teacher 
quality.230  However, the centerpiece of the Act has long been Title I, 
which focuses on the education of poor children.231 
Title I is generally understood as having gone through three 
periods that coincide with different views of the federal role in 
education.  In the first period, from 1965 through 1980, there were 
few specifications on the use of Title I money, and Title I programs 
were typically run at the local level separately from regular education 
in the classroom (although there was a great degree of spillover from 
these funds, which were supposed to be restricted for poor children, 
to other needs of local school districts).232  In the second period, 
during the 1980s, federal spending and regulatory oversight 
decreased.233  The federal government became less focused on 
promoting funding equity and more interested in promoting 
educational excellence, although the understanding was that it was 
states and localities, not the federal government, who would 
undertake the work to achieve that goal.234  In the third period, 
starting with the 1988 reauthorization of the ESEA and continuing 
through today, the federal role began to shift again, as increased 
federal funding accompanied increased requirements.235  The federal 
                                                          
 221. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 222. See, e.g., VINOVSKIS, supra note 20, at 169–70. 
 223. CROSS, supra note 20, at 28. 
 224. See generally DEBRAY, supra note 20, at 81–126. 
 225. See No Child Left Behind Act §§ 1031–1034, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431–11435 
(2006). 
 226. See NCLB tit. I, §§ 1301–1309, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6391–6399. 
 227. See NCLB tit. III, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6801–7104. 
 228. See NCLB § 1051. 
 229. See NCLB tit. IV, §§ 4001–4155, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7165. 
 230. See NCLB tit. II, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6751–6777. 
 231. See NCLB tit. I. 
 232. DEBRAY, supra note 20 at 7–8; Lorraine M. McDonnell, No Child Left Behind 
and the Federal Role in Education:  Evolution or Revolution?, PEABODY J. EDUC., no. 2, 
2005, at 19, 22–25. 
 233. DEBRAY, supra note 20, at 8; McDonnell, supra note 232, at 25–29. 
 234. DEBRAY, supra note 20, at 8–9; see McDonnell, supra note 232, at 25–29. 
 235. DEBRAY, supra note 20, at 9; McDonnell, supra note 232, at 29–33. 
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government started to demand accountability in exchange for funds, 
with a new focus on school-wide programs at the instructional core of 
schools.236  This change reached its most dramatic expansion in 
NCLB.237 
To say that NCLB was (and remains) controversial is putting it 
mildly.  While some states and districts began the work of 
implementing the heightened obligations without objection, a 
number of states and districts balked.238  Almost half of the states took 
some form of action to protest NCLB, whether passing symbolic 
legislation objecting to its reach or considering whether to decline 
the funds.239  The biggest complaint was that the law was inadequately 
funded in comparison to the requirements placed on the states—
requirements that some states felt they were forced into accepting.240  
In a widely publicized exchange in 2004, after the Utah 
superintendent of education made a formal inquiry to the federal 
Department of Education about the consequences of opting out of 
some or all of NCLB, the Department responded that declining to 
participate in any program was entirely up to the state, but that 
turning down Title I funds would have broader financial 
ramifications because a number of other NCLB programs tie their 
funding streams to the amount of Title I funding a state receives.241  
The National Conference of State Legislatures characterized this 
exchange as “sobering,” stating that it “reinforced the notion . . . that 
compliance with NCLB is coerced.”242  Of the two (ultimately 
                                                          
 236. DEBRAY, supra note 20, at 9; McDonnell, supra note 232, at 29–33. 
 237. DEBRAY, supra note 20, at 81–133; McDonnell, supra note 232, at 29–33. 
 238. See, e.g., DEBRAY, supra note 20, at 135–36; Lance D. Fusarelli, Gubernatorial 
Reactions to No Child Left Behind:  Politics, Pressure, and Education Reform, PEABODY J. 
EDUC., no. 2, 2005, at 120, 128–30; McDonnell, supra note 232, at 20; Eloise 
Pasachoff, How the Federal Government Can Improve School Financing Systems 
15 (Jan. 2008) (working paper), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
research/files/papers/2008/1/education%20pasachoff/01_education_pasachoff.pdf.   
Legal scholars have also been divided in their assessments of the law.  For more 
positive views, see, for example, James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No 
Child Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 
1734 (2003); and Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA 
L. REV. 243, 254–57 (2005).  For more critical views, see, for example, Heise, supra 
note 60, at 126; and James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind 
Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 936 (2004). 
 239. William J. Mathis, The Cost of Implementing the Federal No Child Left Behind Act:  
Different Assumptions, Different Answers, PEABODY J. EDUC., no. 2, 2005, at 90, 91–92. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Letter from Eugene W. Hickok, Acting Deputy Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to 
Steven O. Laing, Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, Utah State Office of Educ. 
(Feb. 6, 2004), available at http://www.thompson.com/images/tpg/pdfs/Utah_2004 
_letter.pdf. 
 242. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TASK FORCE ON NO CHILD LEFT 
BEHIND:  FINAL REPORT, at x (2005), available at http://www.hartfordinfo.org/issues 
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unsuccessful) lawsuits that challenged the law as an unfunded 
mandate, one made an additional claim under the Spending Clause, 
arguing that the law was coercive.243 
This experience is influencing the discussion around the pending 
reauthorization of NCLB, as relief from many of the conditions 
imposed by NCLB is under consideration.244  In the meantime, as 
reauthorization has been delayed by several years—the law was 
originally set to expire in 2007245—the Department of Education has 
started to give waivers from some of NCLB’s more stringent 
provisions to states agreeing to certain other, supposedly more 
flexible requirements.246 
The prevalence of these waivers combined with the imminence of 
reauthorization means that NCLB no longer provides a widely 
relevant set of operative legal requirements.  Still, NFIB has reopened 
the debates about the extent to which NCLB exceeded the scope of 
Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause by being coercive.247  
                                                          
/documents/education/nclb.pdf; see also id. at 49–50; Coulter M. Bump, Comment, 
Reviving the Coercion Test:  A Proposal to Prevent Federal Conditional Spending that Leaves 
Children Behind, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 546–57 (2005) (arguing that the coercion 
inquiry should be revitalized to find NCLB unconstitutionally coercive). 
 243. Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 492–94 (D. Conn. 2006) 
(concluding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the state’s 
pre-enforcement declaratory judgment claim against NCLB on coercion grounds), 
aff’d sub nom. Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Sch. Dist. 
of the City of Pontiac v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 255–56 (6th Cir. 
2009) (en banc) (upholding by en banc court split 8–8 the district court’s grant of a 
motion to dismiss a lawsuit alleging that NCLB imposed an unfunded mandate in 
contravention of its statutory language).  Amici in Pontiac made the argument that 
the law was unconstitutionally coercive, but the court stated that the plaintiff 
essentially conceded that the NCLB program was voluntary and did not consider the 
question of coercion further.  City of Pontiac, 584 F.3d at 275 & n.7; see also Martha 
Derthick, Litigation Under No Child Left Behind, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO 
COURTHOUSE:  THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 213, 216–20 (Joshua M. 
Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009). 
 244. See, e.g., Dylan Scott, New NCLB Reauthorization Bills Introduced in U.S. House, 
GOVERNING (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.governing.com/news/federal/gov-new-NCLB-
reauthorization-bills-introduced-in-US-house.html (explaining similarities between the 
House and Senate bills with respect to removal of onerous federal conditions). 
 245. See, e.g., VINOVSKIS, supra note 20, at 200. 
 246. Waivers are granted pursuant to NCLB tit. IX, § 9401, 20 U.S.C. § 7861 
(2006).  See Metzger, supra note 97, at 612–13 (noting that such waivers are 
“contingent on states’ agreeing to federal policy priorities as in Race to the Top”); 
Alyson Klein, More Than Half of States Now Have NCLB Waivers, EDUC. WK., Jul. 18, 
2012, at 22. 
 247. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 109 (manuscript at 31, 46, 48) (considering 
constitutionality of NCLB in light of NFIB); Metzger, supra note 212, at 101 (same); 
Walsh, supra note 28 (anticipating legal challenges to NCLB in light of NFIB); see also Julia 
Martin, Health Care in the Dock:  What’s at Stake for Education?, TITLE I-DERLAND (Apr. 17, 
2012), http://ed.complianceexpert.com/title-i-derland/title-i-derland-1.45712/health-
care-in-the-dock-what-s-at-stake-for-education-1.84194 (suggesting, while NFIB was still 
pending, that NCLB could be in jeopardy if the Court struck down the Medicaid 
expansion as coercive). 
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And the extent to which NCLB could be deemed coercive has 
implications for its reauthorization.  As the rest of this section 
demonstrates, however, reports of NCLB’s death in the wake of NFIB 
are greatly exaggerated. 
2. Old funding conditioned on compliance with a new program 
Were the changes to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
in No Child Left Behind more akin to the Medicaid expansion, and 
therefore the creation of a new and independent program 
conditioning funds on a previously existing one, or closer to previous 
modifications to Medicaid, and therefore simply conditions on the 
use of federal funds? 
While NCLB was a significant revision of the ESEA, nothing about 
it conditions funds for one program on acceptance of another.  
Unlike the plurality’s view of the Medicaid expansion, NCLB is not a 
new program attached to a still-existing old program.  Instead, the 
old program no longer exists, and the program remains unified, 
although seriously transformed.  That NCLB contains no separate 
funding streams for any old and new program, and that its program 
requirements are seamless rather than separated into different 
requirements for old and new beneficiaries, underscore this point.  
Although NCLB expanded requirements under Title I, the same 
requirements are now applicable to every funding recipient, and 
there are no separate streams of money, one for the old program, 
one for the new, to be conditioned on each other.248  Therefore, 
Congress did not use NCLB to threaten any other independent 
significant grant, but merely specified what funds granted under 
NCLB were to be used for.  While the Medicaid expansion had to 
proceed to the rest of the plurality’s coercion analysis, NCLB would 
not. 
One argument to the contrary might seize on the plurality’s 
description of the Medicaid expansion as “a shift in kind, not merely 
                                                          
 248. 20 U.S.C. § 6302(a) (2006) (local educational agency grants).  To be sure, 
NCLB contains two different standards for withholding funds, depending on whether 
the requirements at issue dated from the 1994 reauthorization of the ESEA or the 2001 
reauthorization in NCLB.  For a state that fails to meet the deadlines established in 
the 1994 reauthorization for putting in place certain educational standards, “the 
Secretary shall withhold 25 percent” of the funds that would otherwise be available 
until the deadlines are met.  Id. § 6311(g)(1)(A).  For a state that fails to meet the 
additional requirements of NCLB, the Secretary “may withhold” funds at his 
discretion.  Id. § 6311(g)(2).  Still, the relevant deadlines established in 1994 governed 
substantive activities that NCLB expanded upon.  Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(6) 
(1994) (setting forth requirements for educational standards), with 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) 
(2006) (expanding requirements for educational standards).  It is not as if the 1994 
reauthorization remained in place with its own continued funding stream. 
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degree,”249 making the same case about NCLB.250  This argument 
might point to all of the new aspects of NCLB:  it introduced a heavy 
focus on state standardized assessments;251 required all schools to 
ensure that all students make “adequate yearly progress” on these 
assessments, to report annual success on this measure disaggregated 
by race, income group, disability status, and the like, and to face a 
series of detailed interventions for failure to meet this goal within a 
certain number of years;252 dictated new requirements for teacher 
qualifications;253 and required schools to use teaching methods and 
strategies, and in some cases even curriculum, that are validated by 
“scientifically based research.”254 
This argument might also focus on the shift in purpose between 
the original ESEA of 1965 and the ESEA as reauthorized by NCLB in 
2001.  In 1965, the Act’s stated purpose was “to provide financial 
assistance . . . to local educational agencies serving areas with 
concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and 
improve their educational programs by various means (including 
preschool programs) which contribute particularly to meeting the 
special educational needs of educationally deprived children.”255  In 
2001, the purpose of NCLB was to “to ensure that all children have a 
fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality 
education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State 
academic achievement standards and state academic assessments.”256  
No longer limited to providing money for poor children, the Act now 
focuses on all children.257  Instead of vague language about meeting 
the “educational needs of educationally deprived children,” now the 
                                                          
 249. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012) 
(plurality opinion). 
 250. Professor Metzger raises a version of this argument.  See Metzger, supra note 
212, at 101. 
 251. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 238, at 940. 
 252. See id. at 940–41. 
 253. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6319(a), 7801(23); see also Susanna Loeb & Luke C. Miller, A 
Federal Foray into Teacher Certification:  Assessing the “Highly Qualified Teacher” Provision of 
NCLB, in NCLB AT THE CROSSROADS:  REEXAMINING THE FEDERAL EFFORT TO CLOSE THE 
ACHIEVEMENT GAP 199, 199 (Michael A. Rebell & Jessica R. Wolff eds., 2009); Ryan, 
supra note 238, at 939–40. 
 254. Kathryn A. McDermott & Laura S. Jensen, Dubious Sovereignty:  Federal 
Conditions of Aid and the No Child Left Behind Act, PEABODY J. EDUC., no. 2, 2005, at 
39, 45. 
 255. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, sec. 
2, § 201, 79 Stat. 27, 27. 
 256. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, sec. 101, § 201, 79 
Stat. 27, 27 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006)). 
 257. See id.  
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law demands “proficiency” on state tests.258  Under this argument, 
NCLB would be akin to the Medicaid expansion in that it “is no 
longer a program to” provide federal education funding “for the 
neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive 
national plan to provide universal” excellence and equity in 
education.259 
One could well argue about this characterization of NCLB; the 
academic literature is divided on how much of a radical 
transformation NCLB actually represented.260  The key point, 
however, is that to the extent NCLB represented a transformation of 
the ESEA, the transformation was to the program as a whole.  The 
conditions in the previous version of the law no longer exist.261  
Unlike the Medicaid expansion, which did not change the underlying 
contours of “pre-existing Medicaid,” there is no more “pre-existing 
ESEA” after NCLB.  Therefore, there is no threat to remove funds 
from a separate and independent program, and the conditions under 
NCLB simply govern the use of NCLB funds.  Just as Congress may 
“offer[] funds . . . to expand the availability of health care, and 
require[e]  that States accepting such funds comply with the 
conditions on their use,”262 so may Congress offer funds through 
NCLB to expand the availability of high-quality education through 
the conditions the law imposes. 
A second possible attempt to shoehorn NCLB into NFIB’s analysis 
of Medicaid could try to conceive of NCLB as actually composed of 
two different programs—the new, expanded requirements imposed 
by NCLB on top of the old, lesser requirements of the 1994 law.  This 
argument might emphasize that not everything in NCLB was without 
precedent in its immediate predecessor.  For example, the 1994 
reauthorization required some testing over the course of a child’s 
educational career; NCLB just increased the number and breadth of 
                                                          
 258. Compare Elementary and Secondary Education Act § 201, with No Child Left 
Behind Act § 1001. 
 259. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) 
(plurality opinion). 
 260. Compare, e.g., Heise, supra note 60, at 126 (“NCLB represents a dramatic 
break from the federal government’s traditional posture regarding policymaking for 
the nation’s public elementary and secondary schools.”), with McDonnell, supra note 
232 (arguing that NCLB is better seen as a gradual expansion over the course of 
several reauthorizations). 
 261. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (Supp. II 2003) (outlining requirements for 
state plans to be submitted under No Child Left Behind) with 20 U.S.C. § 6311 
(1994 & Supp. II 1997) (outlining requirements for state plans to be submitted 
under the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994). 
 262. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion). 
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tests required.263  The 1994 reauthorization required that the tests 
would assess the progress of schools and districts participating in Title 
I; NCLB expanded this requirement to assess the progress of all 
schools and districts.264  The 1994 reauthorization required some form 
of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) for some schools; NCLB expanded 
this requirement to require a more specific form of AYP for all 
students in all schools, with the results disaggregated by student 
type.265  If, under the NFIB analysis, the Medicaid expansion is a new 
program added to an existing program, this argument might suggest 
that NCLB is a new program (for example, one requiring testing for 
all students) overlaid onto an existing program (for example, one 
requiring testing for Title I students).  Under this view, the additional 
sums of money authorized under NCLB266 would be intended to 
support the additional obligations.  It would be immaterial that 
Congress sees it all as one program and one funding stream.267  
Congress would thus be conditioning sums of money for a new 
program (increased obligations under NCLB) upon threat of losing 
money for a pre-existing program (the related obligations states were 
in the process of fulfilling under the 1994 reauthorization). 
This argument would have more bite if the NCLB requirements 
were really only additions to the underlying requirements that were 
still in place.  But that is not the case.  None of these requirements 
left the pre-NCLB version intact.  That NCLB’s new requirements 
were on the same theme as pre-NCLB requirements does not 
establish the existence of two separate programs, the new one and 
the pre-existing one. 
Moreover, while the existence of a separate funding stream is not 
necessary for a new set of conditions to constitute an independent 
program, it seems particularly difficult to find an independent 
program without a separate funding stream when the new set of 
conditions are so closely related to the old set.  In this way, NCLB’s 
modifications seem much closer to the NFIB plurality’s 
                                                          
 263. See, e.g., Doris Redfield & Jan Sheinker, Council of Chief State School 
Officers, Framework for Transitioning from IASA to NCLB, September 2004, at 19, 
available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED484704.pdf. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6302(a) (1994) (authorizing $7.4 billion for fiscal year 
1995), with 20 U.S.C. § 6302(a)(1) (Supp. II 2003) (authorizing $13.5 billion for 
fiscal year 2002).  For a description of NCLB’s historic increase of federal education 
funds, see VINOVSKIS, supra note 20, at 170. 
 267. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion). 
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understanding of previous modifications to Medicaid, which “merely 
altered and expanded the boundaries of these categories.”268 
Under the plurality’s analysis, the coercion inquiry should end 
here, because NCLB simply imposes conditions on the use of NCLB 
funds.269  But even if it were possible to see NCLB as constituting two 
programs, the new one conditioning its acceptance on taking away 
funding for the older one, that would not itself constitute coercion 
under the NFIB plurality’s reading.  It would require only turning to 
the next stage of analysis:  Was notice of such a condition part of the 
states’ original understanding of the program? 
3. Notice to the states 
As I have explained, there should be no relevant notice issue with 
respect to NCLB, for the notice required for coercion purposes arises 
only if two independent programs are tied together with acceptance 
of one conditioned on compliance with the other.  As I just 
demonstrated, NCLB consists of one program, not two programs tied 
together; it therefore does not matter how different NCLB is from 
the original ESEA. 
If, however, one were to accept that NCLB consists of two programs 
tied together, it would be difficult to make the case that such notice 
was in place in 1965, since the original ESEA law surely did not 
contemplate any explicit tying together with another program. 
But the absence of such notice would not require a finding that NCLB 
was unconstitutionally coercive.  It would merely lead to the last stage of 
the plurality’s analysis, where the joint dissent would begin:  Do the 
financial terms of the program constitute economic dragooning? 
4. Economic dragooning 
Examination of the financial terms of No Child Left Behind should 
lead to the conclusion that the law does not constitute economic 
dragooning under either the plurality’s analysis or the joint dissent’s. 
The joint dissent referred several times to federal funding for 
elementary and secondary education overall,270 but it is important to 
get the comparison with Medicaid right.  Medicaid is one program 
(or, under the plurality’s reading, two programs), while federal 
funding for elementary and secondary education comes in a variety 
of clearly delineated and obviously independent programs.  NCLB 
                                                          
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See, e.g., id. at 2662–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
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itself encompasses separate programs in its different titles,271 and 
itself is distinct from other separately reauthorized programs 
providing funding for elementary and secondary education, such as 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.272  In order to receive 
federal funding for one education program, states need not 
participate in others.273  The relevant comparison for the question of 
economic dragooning, then, is to examine the size of funding for 
individual programs. 
The largest funding stream that is part of ESEA/NCLB is Title I.274  
In 2008-2009, Title I funds stood at $12.57 billion,275 while federal 
Medicaid funds were over $200 billion.276  Title I funds that year 
constituted only 2.12% of all revenues available for elementary and 
secondary education,277 while federal funds provided 64.6% of all 
spending for Medicaid.278  Perhaps most importantly, Title I funds 
that year represented only 0.8% of the average state’s overall 
budget,279 compared with federal Medicaid funds representing at 
least 10% of the states’ overall budgets.280  The figures for Title I are 
much closer the size of the threatened loss at issue in Dole—less than 
half of one percent of the state’s overall budget281—than they are to 
Medicaid. 
There are other reasons to think that the states have not been 
economically dragooned into accepting Title I funds.  Medicaid is 
                                                          
 271. See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text. 
 272. See, e.g., Jason Delisle & Jennifer Cohen, 2011 Education Appropriations 
Guide, NEW AM. FOUND. 5, 5–6 (May 2011), http://education.newamerica.net/sites 
/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/2011%20Education%20Appropriations%20Guide.pdf. 
 273. Letter from Eugene W. Hickok to Steven O. Laing, supra note 241.  Medicaid 
funding, on the other hand, is all or nothing.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006) 
(describing requirements for state participation in Medicaid).   
 274. DEBRAY, supra note 20, at 3. 
 275. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2012-313, 
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS:  SCHOOL YEAR 2008–09 (FISCAL YEAR 2009) 15 tbl.9 (2011) [hereinafter 
NCES REPORT], available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012313.pdf. 
 276. NASBO, supra note 30, at 47 tbl.28. 
 277. Calculated by dividing $12.571 billion in Title I funds for fiscal year 2009 by $593 
billion in all education revenues received by public elementary and secondary schools that 
year.  See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVENUES FOR PUBLIC 
ELEMANTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, BY SOURCE AND STATE OR JURISDICTION: 2008–09, at 
tbl.181 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_181.asp 
 (listing all education revenues regardless of source for each state within the 
United States). 
 278. NASBO, supra note 30, at 46 fig.16. 
 279. Calculated by dividing $12.571 billion in Title I funds for fiscal year 2009 by 
$1.558 trillion in overall state expenditures for fiscal year 2009.  See id. at 7 tbl.1 
(listing overall state expenditures for fiscal year 2009). 
 280. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–05 (2012) 
(plurality opinion). 
 281. Id. at 2604. 
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essentially a federal program.  It was designed by the federal 
government and offered to the states to do something that states were 
not already doing in 1965; that is why the federal share of Medicaid 
spending is so high.  While Title I is also a federal program designed 
by the federal government, the states were already providing 
education, including to poor children, in 1965.282  Indeed, the right 
to education is enshrined in state constitutions, unlike the right to a 
minimum level of health care.283  The federal money is designed to be 
supplemental.284  The plurality’s concern about the sunk costs 
embedded in state administrative and regulatory regimes to 
implement the federal program285 thus finds little comparison in Title 
I and elementary and secondary education more generally.  The 
administrative regimes set up to implement Medicaid would not have 
existed without the federal program.  The administrative regimes to 
implement elementary and secondary education were certainly aided 
by federal dollars, but they would have existed in any event. 
It is also relevant that nothing in “existing” Medicaid—that is, the 
Medicaid program before the ACA—was found unconstitutionally 
coercive.  The plurality did not suggest that the size or scope of 
“existing” Medicaid constituted economic dragooning and reiterated 
that Congress can “condition the receipt of funds on the States’ 
complying with restrictions on the use of those funds”286 without 
suggesting that at some point a program can become too large to 
turn down.  The joint dissent did raise this latter concern, but its 
recitation of the facts regarding Medicaid’s size expressed no concern 
that Medicaid itself had already crossed that line.287  And if existing 
Medicaid remains within the line, Title I and other programs within 
NCLB must as well, given their much smaller size. 
Nor does anything about the “goal and structure”288 of Title I or 
NCLB as a whole suggest that the law was designed to preclude states 
from refusing the offer of funds, contrary to the joint dissent’s view of 
the Medicaid expansion.289  The law would still work even if different 
states backed out.  To be sure, some states would then require the tests, 
                                                          
 282. How well they were providing this education is another question, but that 
they were providing it is beyond doubt. 
 283. See, e.g., John Dinan, School Finance Litigation:  The Third Wave Recedes, in FROM 
SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE, supra note 243, at 96, 97–101. 
 284. 20 U.S.C. § 6321(b) (2006) (“Federal funds to supplement, not supplant, 
non-Federal funds.”). 
 285. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (plurality opinion). 
 286. Id. at 2603–04. 
 287. Id. at 2661–62 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 288. Id. at 2664. 
 289. Id. at 2661–62. 
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teacher qualifications, and so on required by NCLB, while other states 
would not; but because NCLB itself let states decide how to design the 
tests, what the minimum teacher qualifications should be, etc., the 
patchwork quality of coverage would not be dramatically different.290 
While these facts underscore the dramatic differences between 
NCLB and Medicaid spending that should result in the conclusion 
that NCLB would survive the economic dragooning inquiry, there 
are, nonetheless, a handful of possible arguments to the contrary that 
should be considered.  First is the issue of the percentage of funds at 
stake.  Both the plurality and the joint dissent emphasized that 
100% of the states’ Medicaid funds were at stake, ignoring Justice 
Ginsburg’s observation that the Secretary actually had discretion 
about how much to withhold, and that “political pressures” might 
make the Secretary “all the more reluctant to cut off funds Congress 
has appropriated for a State’s needy citizens.”291  NCLB contains a 
similar withholding provision, assigning the Education Secretary the 
same discretion with respect to any individual grant, such as Title I.292 
As I suggested earlier, however, what seemed most important for 
the plurality and dissent was not merely that 100% of the program’s 
funding was at stake, but that it was 100% of a substantial amount of 
money, representing a sizeable share of the state’s overall budget.293  
The joint dissent, for example, contrasted the $233 billion at stake in 
the Medicaid expansion with the $614.7 million at stake in Dole, 
noting that “[w]ithholding $614.7 million, equaling only 0.19% of all 
state expenditures combined, is aptly characterized as ‘relatively mild 
encouragement,’ but threatening to withhold $233 billion, equaling 
21.86% of all state expenditures combined, is a different matter.”294  
For South Dakota, the state in question in Dole, the loss of Title I 
funds in 2008–2009 would have been $44 million,295 or 1.2% of all 
                                                          
 290. As Professor Ryan points out, this aspect of NCLB’s design works against its 
intent to raise the achievement of all students.  See Ryan, supra note 238, at 940–41. 
 291. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 n.27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring 
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (discussing scope of the Secretary’s 
discretion to withhold funds under 42 U.S.C. § 1396c). 
 292. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g)(2) (2006) (stating that if a state plan fails to meet the 
requirements, “the Secretary may withhold funds” (emphasis added)); id. § 1234d(a) 
(stating in General Provisions Concerning Education, “the Secretary may withhold 
from a recipient, in whole or in part, further payments (including payments for 
administrative costs) under an applicable program”). 
 293. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
 294. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting); 
see also id. at 2661 (discussing the coercive potential of “large grants to the States”); 
id. at 2663 (discussing “the sheer size of this federal spending program in relation to 
state expenditures”); id. at 2605 (plurality opinion) (calling “threatened loss of over 
10 percent of a State’s overall budget . . . economic dragooning”). 
 295. NCES REPORT, supra note 275, at 15 tbl.9. 
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state expenditures combined.296  Even in 2009–2010, with the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)297 
providing a historic and temporarily high amount of Title I funds,298 
the loss to South Dakota from refusing to comply with Title I would 
have been $59 million,299 or 1.5% of all state expenditures 
combined.300  For Florida, one of the lead plaintiffs in NFIB, the loss 
of Title I funds in 2008–2009 would have been just shy of $694 
million,301 or 1.1% of all state expenditures combined.302  In 2009–
2010, with ARRA’s historically high Title I funding, Florida’s loss 
would have been $892 million,303 or 1.4% of all state expenditures 
combined.304  Again, these figures are far closer to Dole’s figures than 
the Medicaid figures in NFIB.  Under this logic, that 100% of Title I 
funds were theoretically at issue would not make the grant coercive. 
Another potential counterargument of particular relevance to the 
education arena is the joint dissent’s suggestion that one ought to be 
particularly concerned about coercion in areas where federal grants 
“permit Congress to dictate policy in areas traditionally governed 
primarily at the state or local level.”305  Recall the joint dissent’s 
illustration of this concern, suggesting that it would be coercive if the 
federal government were to offer states an amount of money equal to 
the sum states currently spend from their own budgets on education, 
conditioned on the states’ acceptance of federal prescriptions in the 
areas of curriculum, teacher hiring, student discipline rules, and the 
like.306  An argument in favor of NCLB’s coerciveness might note that 
NCLB already “dictates policy” in a number of these arenas,307 but for 
                                                          
 296. Calculated by dividing $44 million in Title I funds, see id., by $3.5 billion in 
overall expenditures, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 7 tbl.1. 
 297. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.). 
 298. See, e.g., NASBO, supra note 30, at 14 (describing the one-time increase in 
education funding under the Recovery Act). 
 299. MARK DIXON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCES: 2010, at 2 
tbl.2 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/govs/school/10f33pub.pdf. 
 300. Calculated by dividing $59 million in Title I funds, see id., by $3.8 billion in 
overall state expenditures, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 11 tbl.5. 
 301. NCES REPORT, supra note 275, at 15 tbl.9. 
 302. Calculated by dividing $694 million in Title I funds, see id., by $60 billion in 
overall state expenditures, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 7 tbl.1. 
 303. DIXON, supra note 299, at 2 tbl.2. 
 304. Calculated by dividing $892 million in Title I funds, see id., by $60 billion in 
overall state expenditures, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 7 tbl.1. 
 305. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012) 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 306. Id. 
 307. On curriculum, see, for example, McDermott & Jensen, supra note 254, at 
46–47, explaining how NCLB’s focus on “scientifically based research” “marks a 
major extension of federal control over curricula”; and Ryan, supra note 76, at 54, 
explaining that current federal education law prohibits Congress from imposing 
“specific” curricula on the states, but does not prohibit regulation in curricular 
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a sum much less than the state’s entire annual education 
expenditures, and go on to propose that the states have thus been 
forced to relinquish their sovereignty on these matters. 
As I explained above, however, the joint dissent did not say that 
imposing conditions of this sort or in this area of regulation are 
necessarily coercive.308  To the contrary, it is the size of the grant 
offered in exchange for the conditions that matters:  The example 
explicitly contemplates the federal government offering “a grant 
equal to the State’s entire annual expenditures for primary and 
secondary education.”309  In 2010, all state expenditures on 
elementary and secondary education stood at $261 billion.310  A 
federal grant in this amount would be almost four times the $70 
billion in federal money the states actually received for elementary 
and secondary education overall that year,311 more than twenty times 
the $12 billion provided under Title I,312 and would even surpass the 
$233 billion in federal money the states spent on Medicaid that year 
by almost $30 billion.313  In other words, as these figures show, the 
joint dissent’s hypothetical contemplates an amount of federal 
funding that would be off the charts in comparison to what actually 
exists.  That the joint dissent would find $278 billion in imagined 
federal education funding troublesome does not easily lead to the 
conclusion that it would find $12 billion in actual Title I funding 
troublesome. 
A third potential argument that NCLB is coercive would focus on 
the increased amounts of state spending required by the Act.  This 
was the states’ primary objection to NCLB; they claimed it imposed 
an unfunded mandate on them.  It was this objection that gave rise to 
a coercion claim in one of the lawsuits challenging the law.314  Yet 
NFIB does not actually provide much support for this argument.  
Recall the plurality’s explanation that “the size of the new financial 
                                                          
matters more generally.  On teacher hiring, see, for example, 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)(2) 
(2006), requiring that all teachers of core academic subjects in schools receiving 
federal funds under NCLB be “highly qualified”; and id. § 7801(23), defining “highly 
qualified” teachers.  On discipline, see, for example, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-01-210, STUDENT DISCIPLINE:  INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 
ACT 3 (2001), stating that “[i]n recent years . . . federal law has required states and 
local districts to implement certain discipline-related policies in schools . . . .” 
 308. See supra notes 205–15 and accompanying text. 
 309. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 310. See NASBO, supra note 30, at 16 tbl.7 (showing the source figures for this 
amount, which is calculated by subtracting federal funds from total state 
expenditures for fiscal year 2010). 
 311. Id. 
 312. NCES REPORT, supra note 275, at 15 tbl.9. 
 313. NASBO, supra note 30, at 47 tbl.28. 
 314. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
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burden imposed on a State is irrelevant in analyzing whether the 
State has been coerced into accepting that burden,” because “‘[y]our 
money or your life’ is a coercive proposition, whether you have a 
single dollar in your pocket or $500.”315  On this logic, what really 
matters is the amount of federal money at stake and the relationship 
of that money to the state’s overall budget.  If the amount at stake in 
Title I is itself not coercive, then it would not matter for coercion 
purposes how much the state would have to spend to fulfill the Title I 
conditions, since it could just turn down the Title I funds. 
The joint dissent did discuss at some length the amount of state 
funds that the Medicaid expansion required as relevant to its 
conclusion that the expansion was coercive.316  But, as I indicated 
above, it is unclear that such an increase would, on its own, lead the 
joint dissent to find coercion where the overall federal grant was not 
itself troublesomely large.317  To be sure, if the joint dissent would 
take the increase in expected state contributions as independently 
supporting a finding of coercion, the amount of additional state 
spending expected by NCLB is similar, under some calculations, to 
the amount of additional state spending expected by the Medicaid 
expansion.318 
Even so, I doubt that the amount of additional state spending 
associated with NCLB would lead to a finding of coercion, for two 
reasons.  First, the calculations about increased state spending are 
rooted in so-called “adequacy studies”319 from school finance 
litigation that the political right tends to treat as anathema, on the 
grounds that the calculations themselves are not rooted in anything 
meaningful and that money is not the key factor in schools’ ability to 
provide quality education.320  Taking these studies seriously in the 
context of a coercion inquiry would give them an imprimatur that 
                                                          
 315. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 n.12 (plurality opinion). 
 316. Id. at 2665–66 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 317. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. 
 318. Compare NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (calculating increased state administrative costs at $12 billion between 2014 
and 2020 and increased substantive costs at somewhere between $20 billion and $43.2 
billion through 2019 plus $60 billion from 2019 through 2021), with Mathis, supra note 
239, at 114 (calculating increased administrative costs at $11.3 billion, offset by $4.6 
billion in federal funds, and increased substantive costs of $137.8 billion, in order to 
achieve NCLB’s goals of making all students “proficient” by 2014). 
 319. Mathis, supra note 239, at 103–04. 
 320. Id. (explaining five methods of conducting adequacy studies).  See generally 
Williamson M. Evers & Paul Clopton, High-Spending, Low-Performing School Districts, in 
COURTING FAILURE:  HOW SCHOOL FINANCE LAWSUITS EXPLOIT JUDGES’ GOOD 
INTENTIONS AND HARM OUR CHILDREN 103, 103–04 (Eric A. Hanushek ed., 2006); E.D. 
Hirsch Jr., Adequacy Beyond Dollars:  The Productive Use of School Time, in COURTING 
FAILURE, supra, at 313, 326. 
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they currently lack for school finance cases.  It therefore seems 
unlikely to me that either litigants or judges sympathetic to the views 
of the joint dissent would find these adequacy studies reliable, 
persuasive, or desirable. 
Moreover, there is a more than colorable claim that a good deal of 
the spending prompted by NCLB is already required by state 
constitution, at least in those states where courts have held the 
education provision in the state constitution to require the provision 
of an adequate education.321  Unlike the increased state spending 
required by the Medicaid expansion, then, it is possible to see the 
increased state spending required by NCLB as the result of a federal 
incentive for states to meet their own constitutional obligations. 
A final potential objection to NCLB on coercion grounds might 
point to the joint dissent’s concern that the loss of Medicaid funds 
would subject states to additional burdens, whether in the loss of 
federal funding tied to Medicaid eligibility or in other federal 
obligations that assume the existence of Medicaid funding.322  As the 
Department of Education explained to Utah in 2004, because NCLB 
uses Title I funding as part of the formula for calculating a state’s 
share of certain other NCLB funding programs, turning down Title I 
funds would have the practical consequence of losing more than 
simply those funds.323 
But even assuming that the Title I formula underlay all of the other 
programs in NCLB such that turning down Title I money jeopardized 
all NCLB money—which is not the case—the size of the funds and 
the percentage of the states’ overall budgets at stake do not come 
close to the circumstances the Court found coercive with respect to 
Medicaid.  In 2003, the fiscal year that was the subject of Utah’s 
correspondence with the Department of Education, Utah received 
approximately $107 million in total NCLB funds (of which 
approximately $46 million was Title I money).324  These total NCLB 
funds constituted barely 1.4% of Utah’s state expenditures  of over 
                                                          
 321. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely 
Imagined:  The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 299 (2003) (suggesting that the requirements of NCLB will 
reinvigorate lawsuits under state education clauses by providing more concrete ways 
to define adequacy); see also Mathis, supra note 239, at 106–12 tbl.3 (showing that 
some of the adequacy studies under review were conducted for state litigation). 
 322. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 323. See Letter from Eugene W. Hickok to Steven O. Laing, supra note 241 
(explaining that although a state may feel free to opt out of receiving Title I funds 
with no repercussion, other funds are inherently tied to Title I funding streams, 
which may result in secondary and tertiary losses of funding for the refusing state).   
 324. Id. 
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$7.5 billion that year.325  As a conservative Utah-based think tank 
commented in 2010, turning down NCLB funds “would not be 
insurmountable and could even prove to be quite manageable over 
time,” especially because Utah increased its own state education 
spending, completely separate from NCLB funds, by $125 million per 
year since 2002, “nearly double the amount needed to cover per 
pupil expenditures for increased enrollment.”326 
Utah’s experience is not unique.  Total funds granted to the 
states under NCLB were about $24.9 billion in fiscal year 2010,327 
just 1.5% of the overall state expenditures of $1.6 trillion.328  While a 
little higher than the percentage of the state budget at stake in Dole, 
these figures are nowhere near the minimum loss of 10% of the state 
budget that concerned the Court in NFIB.  And these sums are on the 
high end, as this money represents all ESEA funds, while only some 
ESEA grant programs rely on the amount a state receives under Title 
I, and even those grant programs count Title I money for only part of 
the grant formula.329 
In sum, none of the indicia of economic dragooning that existed 
with respect to Medicaid are present here.  Especially if the joint 
dissent’s suggestion that the “coercive nature of an offer [must be] 
unmistakably clear”330 is taken seriously, NCLB overall and Title I in 
particular should survive any coercion challenge under NFIB. 
I turn next to the other major source of federal funding for 
education:  the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 
B. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
1. Background and history of coercion analysis 
In the years immediately following the passage of the ESEA of 
1965, Congress passed a few minor funding programs to support the 
                                                          
 325. Calculated by dividing $107 million in NCLB funds, see id., by $7.5 billion in 
overall state expenditures, see NAT’L ASSOC. OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE 
EXPENDITURE REPORT 2003, at 6 tbl.1 (2004), available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites 
/default/files/ER_2003.pdf (listing overall state expenditures for fiscal year 2003). 
 326. Matthew C. Piccolo, NCLB:  Selling Utah’s Schools for a Mess of Pottage, 
SUTHERLAND INST. 3 (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.sutherlandinstitute.org/uploaded 
_files/sdmc/NCLB-_Selling_Utahs_Schools.pdf. 
 327. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY FUNDS, FY 2008–FY 2013 
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET (2012) [hereinafter DOE SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY FUNDS], available 
at http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget13/summary/appendix1.pdf. 
 328. Calculated by dividing $24.9 billion in overall NCLB funds, see id., by $1.6 
trillion in overall state expenditures, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 7 tbl.1. 
 329. Letter from Eugene W. Hickok to Steven O. Laing, supra note 241. 
 330. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012) 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also supra 
note 202–04. 
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education of children with disabilities.331  These programs eventually 
blossomed into a major new piece of legislation, the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975,332 renamed the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act in 1990.333  Most programs to support 
elementary and secondary education are reauthorized as part of the 
ESEA, but the IDEA remains its own separate legislation and is 
reauthorized on a different schedule.334 
The IDEA consists of three different funding programs.  The main 
one, Part B, provides grants to states to support the education of 
school-aged children with disabilities.335  Part C provides smaller 
grants to support states’ efforts to aid infants and toddlers with 
disabilities,336 and Part D provides other small grants for a variety of 
national activities.337  In recent years, Part B has been funded at 
around $11.5 billion each year, making it the second largest federal 
education program, after Title I.338  Parts C and D together have 
recently been funded at approximately $1 billion each year.339 
While the ESEA was primarily driven and drafted by the White 
House, Congress and the states were much more active in the genesis 
of the IDEA.340  The law grew out of nationwide state-level lawsuits in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s that challenged, as violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the segregation of children with disabilities 
from their non-disabled classmates or the outright exclusion of 
children with disabilities from school at all.341  As states all over the 
country prepared to face these lawsuits or found themselves dealing 
with their repercussions, they turned to Congress for financial 
assistance.342 
With this federal financial assistance came conditions that 
paralleled the remedies in the first two lawsuits.343  All children with 
disabilities were to have the right to a “free appropriate public 
education,” which would consist of special education and related 
                                                          
 331. R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES:  INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 151–52 
(1994). 
 332. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.  See generally MELNICK, supra note 331, at 149–57. 
 333. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990). 
 334. RICHARD N. APLING & NANCY LEE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32716, THE 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA):  ANALYSIS OF CHANGES MADE BY 
P.L. 108-446, at 1 (2005). 
 335. IDEA tit. I, pt. B, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411–1419 (2006). 
 336. IDEA tit. I, pt. C, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1431–1444. 
 337. IDEA tit. I, pt. D, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1450–1482. 
 338. See DOE SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY FUNDS, supra note 327. 
 339. Id. 
 340. See MELNICK, supra note 331, at 148–57. 
 341. See id. at 141–47. 
 342. See id. at 148–49. 
 343. MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 729 (5th ed. 2012). 
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services.344  Children were to be educated in the “least restrictive 
environment”—in other words, to be mainstreamed as much as 
possible with their non-disabled peers.345  The special education and 
related services to be provided to each child for a school year would 
be specified in a collaboratively designed “individualized education 
program.”346  Parents had the right to challenge the school district’s 
decisions through an “impartial due process hearing” and then in 
federal court.347  These features remain at the core of the law even as 
it has been reauthorized and expanded over the years, most recently 
in 2004, when some of its provisions were aligned with NCLB’s 
requirements.348 
The argument that the IDEA is coercive has arisen in several 
different contexts.  The most general argument is that the IDEA is 
effectively an unfunded mandate, imposing detailed and onerous 
conditions but providing nowhere near enough money to pay for 
them, trapping cash-strapped states and districts into staying in the 
program in exchange for necessary, but insufficient, federal funds.349  
More specific versions of this argument have been made in litigation 
with respect to particular provisions of the IDEA.  Several cases have 
considered whether the requirement that participating states waive 
their sovereign immunity as a condition of participation is coercive.350  
These arguments have not been successful, but NFIB potentially 
opens the door for their reconsideration.  The same is true for the 
                                                          
 344. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(16)–(18), 1413(a)(2) (1976). 
 345. Id. § 1418(d)(2)(A). 
 346. Id. § 1414(a)(5). 
 347. Id. § 1415(b)(2). 
 348. See generally ROBERT SILVERSTEIN, CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH 
DISABILITIES, A USER’S GUIDE TO THE 2004 IDEA REAUTHORIZATION (P.L. 108-446 
AND THE CONFERENCE REPORT) (2005), available at http://www.c-c-d.org/task_forces 
/education/IdeaUserGuide.pdf (identifying modifications to the IDEA). 
 349. See, e.g., PIETRO S. NIVOLA, TENSE COMMANDMENTS:  FEDERAL PRESCRIPTIONS AND 
CITY PROBLEMS 38–43, 151–52 (2002) (discussing the IDEA as an unfunded mandate); 
Paul T. Hill, The Federal Role in Education, 2000 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUC. POL’Y 11, 
22–23 (describing the expensive requirements that came with the IDEA). 
 350. See, e.g., Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 287 (5th Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity in the IDEA is not 
unconstitutionally coercive because a “state can avoid suit under the IDEA merely by 
refusing IDEA funds”); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 255 (3d Cir. 
2003) (“We do not deny the considerable pressures placed on states to accept federal 
special education funds, but we cannot conclude that the IDEA, recognized as a 
model of cooperative federalism, gives rise to unconstitutional compulsion.” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 
935 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the IDEA waiver of sovereign immunity 
requirement is valid under the Spending Clause); see also Eloise Pasachoff, Block 
Grants, Early Childhood Education, and the Reauthorization of Head Start:  From Positional 
Conflict to Interest-Based Agreement, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 387–88 (2006) 
(discussing the IDEA waiver of sovereign immunity provision). 
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argument that threatening to withhold a state’s entire IDEA grant for 
noncompliance with one particular application is coercive.351  Six of 
thirteen judges in the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc found this 
argument persuasive.352  NFIB could lead to efforts to turn this 
conclusion into a majority opinion. 
The rest of this section demonstrates that these efforts are not 
likely to be successful.  Careful application of the NFIB coercion 
analysis to the IDEA shows that, as with NCLB, the IDEA simply does 
not rise to the level of concern presented by the Medicaid expansion. 
Before turning to this analysis, it is important to consider the 
possibility that the IDEA was enacted under Congress’s authority 
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as 
Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause.  If IDEA were 
enacted under Section 5 authority, the coercion inquiry would be less 
relevant because, within certain limits, Congress can impose conditions 
on the states through its Section 5 power without offering states a 
genuine choice in the matter.353  In the 1980s, the Supreme Court 
twice suggested that the IDEA had Fourteenth Amendment roots.354  
More recently, Justice Ginsburg, writing only for herself, made the 
same suggestion.355 
The issue has not been decided, but given the current state of 
Section 5 doctrine, it does not seem likely that a majority of the 
Roberts Court would accept the premise that the IDEA is valid 
Section 5 legislation.  Under this doctrine, Congress may enact 
prophylactic legislation that goes beyond the substantive 
requirements of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
contains the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, only if there 
is “congruence and proportionality” between the legislation and the 
constitutional violations that gave rise to the legislation.356  Using its 
Section 5 powers, Congress could presumably order states to give 
                                                          
 351. Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569–70 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 352. Id. at 560–61, 569–70. 
 353. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 76, at 48. 
 354. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227, n.1 (1989) (noting that the petitioner 
conceded that the law was enacted under Congress’s Section 5 authority and saying 
that the Court would “decide the case on these assumptions”); Smith v. Robinson, 
468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984) (explaining that the law was “set up by Congress to aid the 
States in complying with their constitutional obligations to provide public education 
for handicapped children”). 
 355. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 305 (2006) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (questioning 
the Court’s “repeated references to a Spending Clause derived ‘clear notice’ 
requirement” on a number of grounds, including that the “IDEA was enacted not 
only pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause authority, but also pursuant to § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 356. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
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children with disabilities access to public education, but it is difficult 
to imagine a majority of this Court concluding that the entirety of the 
IDEA passed this congruent and proportional test.357  Therefore, 
whether the IDEA can survive a Spending Clause challenge on 
coercion grounds is of great importance to its future. 
2. Old funding conditioned on compliance with a new program 
Like NCLB and Title I, the IDEA as reauthorized in 2004 cannot 
fairly be read as a new program against which funds for the old 
program are conditioned.  The law is better seen as a “modification 
of the existing program.”358  Part B contains the same key features 
that have been present since 1975:  the focus on providing special 
education and related services;359 the requirement that all children 
with disabilities are entitled to a “free appropriate public 
education,”360 in the least restrictive environment,361 as detailed in an 
individualized education program;362 the attention to the rights of 
both children with disabilities and their parents;363 and the same 
focus on parental enforcement.364 
Of course, as is common for legislation that is periodically 
reauthorized, there have been some significant changes over time as 
the program has expanded.  Some changes have expanded the 
population of children eligible to be served by the statute.  For 
example, the list of eligible disability categories has grown to include 
autism and traumatic brain injuries,365 and children between the ages 
                                                          
 357. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 76, at 48, 70 n.16 (concluding that the IDEA could 
not “be justified as a legitimate exercise of Congress’s Section 5 powers”); see also Bd. 
of Educ. v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Having enacted [the IDEA] 
under its spending power, Congress did not need to rely on § 5.”); Bradley v. Ark. 
Dep’t of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, 758 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding, based on the 
Supreme Court’s new § 5 doctrine, that the IDEA is not valid § 5 legislation, and 
overruling Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 1999), on this 
ground), aff’d en banc sub nom. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 358. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012) 
(plurality opinion). 
 359. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1), (16)–(17) (1976), with 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3), 
(26), (29) (2006). 
 360. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2) (1976), with 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 361. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1418(d)(2) (1976), with 20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
 362. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976), with 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (2006). 
 363. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1401 note (1976), with 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (2006); 
see also Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007) 
(holding that parents have individually enforceable rights under the IDEA). 
 364. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976), with 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006).  For an 
analysis of the way the IDEA’s reliance on parental enforcement systematically 
shortchanges disabled children in poverty, see Eloise Pasachoff, Special 
Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1413, 1424–29 (2011). 
 365. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976), with 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(1) (2006). 
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of three and nine are also eligible to be identified with 
“developmental delays.”366  The original legislation included a cap on 
the number of children with “specific learning disabilities” at 2% of 
the overall population of school-aged children,367 but this cap has 
since been removed,368 leading to a dramatic expansion in the 
proportion of children with this diagnosis served by the statute.369  
Additionally, a subset of IDEA funds may now be used to provide 
early intervention services to children who have not yet been 
identified with a disability but who nonetheless may need some extra 
support in the classroom.370 
Other changes have broadened the substantive obligations placed 
on states and districts receiving money under the statute.  For 
example, the list of services that might be included under “related 
services” has expanded to include social work services and 
interpreting services alongside the counseling services, psychological 
services, and physical and occupational therapy that were originally 
included in the list of “other supportive services” that might qualify 
for coverage.371  The legal and reporting obligations placed on states 
and districts have also grown over time, so that (for example) the law 
now requires participating states to waive their sovereign immunity372 
and submit certain data on participating students and their 
placements,373 provides that prevailing parents may have their 
attorneys’ fees reimbursed,374 and requires that states and districts 
provide parents with an option to mediate disputes about their 
child’s education.375  The 2004 reauthorization also brought the 
IDEA into conformity with some aspects of NCLB, such as requiring 
that special education teachers be “highly qualified” and that 
                                                          
 366. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(B) (2006). 
 367. Pub. L. No. 94-142 sec. 5(a), § 611(a)(5)(A), 89 Stat. 773, 777. 
 368. Procedures for Evaluating Specific Learning Disabilities, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,082, 
65,085 (Dec. 29, 1977). 
 369. Children with specific learning disabilities now constitute around 4% of the 
population of school-aged children, almost 45% of all children served by the IDEA.  
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 30TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2008, at 44 fig.11, 45 tbl.10 
(2011), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2008/parts-b-
c/30th-idea-arc.pdf (showing the percentage of students ages six through twenty-one 
under IDEA, Part B, by disability category). 
 370. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1413(a)(4)(i), (f) (2006). 
 371. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976), with 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A) (2006). 
 372. 20 U.S.C. § 1403 (2006). 
 373. Id. § 1418(a). 
 374. Id. § 1415(i)(3). 
 375. Id. § 1415(e). 
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children with disabilities be generally included in assessments for 
accountability purposes.376 
But none of the changes to the IDEA Part B over time have altered 
the fundamental responsibilities of the districts that serve children 
with disabilities and the states that oversee the districts.  The addition 
of legal and service obligations do not constitute “a shift in kind, not 
merely degree.”377  For example, the social work services specified in a 
later amendment are comparable to counseling services in the 
original Act.378  The requirement that prevailing parents may have 
their attorneys’ fees reimbursed merely adds a remedy to an 
enforcement regime that already existed.379  The additions of a 
mediation option and the sovereign immunity waiver simply broaden 
the scope of enforcement options.380  And the requirements for 
special education teachers and inclusion of children with disabilities 
in state testing regimes easily connect to a purpose of the Act that has 
been in place since 1975—“to assess, and ensure the effectiveness of, 
efforts to educate children with disabilities.”381  None of these 
modifications leads to the conclusion that these features constitute a 
new and separate program on top of the old one. 
Nor does the expansion of program beneficiaries represent a 
“change in kind.”  The addition of some disability categories seems 
akin to the pre-ACA changes to Medicaid that, the plurality 
explained, “merely altered and expanded the boundaries of 
[eligibility] categories.”382  The removal of the statutory cap on the 
percentage of children diagnosed with “specific learning 
disabilities”383 was anticipated in the original legislation, thus giving 
states notice of the likely expansion of this category.384  And while 
diagnosing children with “specific learning disabilities” is difficult, 
the boundaries of the category remain policed, for better or for 
                                                          
 376. Id. §§ 1401(10), 1412(14)(C). 
 377. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012) 
(plurality opinion). 
 378. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976), with 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A) (2006). 
 379. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3) (2006), with 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). 
 380. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006), with 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). 
 381. Id. § 1400(d)(4) (2006); Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 
Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 3(a), 89 Stat. 773, 775. 
 382. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605. 
 383. See Procedures for Evaluating Specific Learning Disabilities, 42 Fed. Reg. 
65,082 (Dec. 29, 1977). 
 384. 89 Stat. 794 (directing Commissioner of Education to prescribe regulations 
that “establish specific criteria for determining whether a particular disorder or 
condition may be considered a specific learning disability” and providing for the 
deletion of the statutory cap limiting the percentage of children diagnosed with 
learning disabilities as of the date the regulations become effective). 
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worse,385 so it is not a “universal” category in the way the plurality 
deemed the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid was.386  Not even the ability 
to use a subset of IDEA funds for children without disabilities as part 
of an “early intervention” strategy387 can fairly be called a move to 
“universal” services.  Those funds are still limited to children who 
need extra support to succeed in the classroom,388 and such services 
are intended to aid in the diagnosis of learning disabilities.389  Early 
intervention services are also supposed to narrow eligibility for the 
category of learning disability by separating out those students who 
respond to early interventions and who thus need no further services 
under the IDEA.390  And, most importantly, whether to use IDEA 
funds to support children not identified as disabled is completely 
discretionary.391  Districts may choose to use up to 15% of their IDEA 
funds for this purpose, but need not do so in order to get IDEA 
funds.392  This choice further distinguishes the expansion of 
beneficiaries via early intervention from the Medicaid expansion in 
the ACA, under which funds were only available to states that chose 
to serve the new eligibility group.393   
Regardless of these expansions, then, the IDEA remains a program 
devoted to “the neediest among us” with respect to disabilities that 
require additional services in school.  It is not “an element of a 
comprehensive national plan to provide universal” educational 
support to low-performing children in general.394 
                                                          
 385. For thoughtful examinations of this effort, see generally MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN 
LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE:  AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS 
WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1998); and James E. Ryan, Poverty as Disability and the 
Future of Special Education Law, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152557. 
 386. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
 387. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(f)(1) (2006). 
 388. Id. (limiting such services to those “who have not been identified as needing 
special education or related services but who need additional academic and 
behavioral support to succeed in a general education environment”). 
 389. Id. § 1414(a)(6)(B); see also Angela A. Ciolfi & James E. Ryan, Race and 
Response-To-Intervention in Special Education, 54 HOW. L.J. 303, 310 (2011) (explaining 
that Response-To-Intervention is a form of early intervention services on which 
school districts can rely “as a diagnostic tool to identify children with specific 
learning disabilities”). 
 390. Ciolfi & Ryan, supra note 389, at 305 (explaining that Response-To-
Intervention was intended to “reduce the overall numbers of students found eligible 
for special education”). 
 391. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4) (calling the use of funds for early intervention 
services “permissive”). 
 392. Id. § 1413(f)(1) (providing that a district “may not use more than 15%” of its 
IDEA funds on early intervention services, rather than mandating that it use any of 
its funds in this way). 
 393. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) 
(plurality opinion) (describing mandatory requirements under the Medicaid expansion). 
 394. Id. at 2606. 
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Moreover, as with Title I, the funding for Part B of the Act remains 
unified.  Unlike the Medicaid expansion, there is no separate 
funding stream to cover newly eligible beneficiaries, nor are they 
subject to different requirements or benefits.395  The same is true for 
the addition of service requirements, the mediation option, and the 
like—no separate funds are allocated specifically to certain 
programs.396  There is one separate funding stream in Part B that did 
not exist when the IDEA was first passed in 1975—funding to provide 
preschool for children with disabilities, a program that dates back to 
1986.397  But this funding is not tied to the other Part B requirements, 
and states need not accept this additional preschool program if they 
want regular Part B funding.398  This preschool program is thus 
unlike the Medicaid expansion as well. 
For all of these reasons, the changes to the IDEA over time are not 
comparable to the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid.  The conditions in 
the IDEA govern the use of IDEA funds.  They do not threaten to 
remove funds for noncompliance with an independent program. 
3. Notice to the states 
Because the IDEA contains no independent program conditioning 
funds on compliance with another program, the plurality’s notice 
requirement does not apply.  If a court were, however, to determine 
that the IDEA did contain independent programs conditioned on 
each other, it is hard to see how proper notice would exist, as with 
NCLB and Title I.  But, as I have explained, that would not make the 
                                                          
 395. There are two different funding formulas for elementary and secondary 
education under Part B.  The formula for the maximum amount a state may receive 
in any given year appears at 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2).  The formula for the actual 
amount that a state will receive in any given year appears at 20 U.S.C. § 1411(d).  
These different formulas still represent only one funding stream, as the states 
actually receive money only under § 1411(d).  This is therefore different from the 
different funding streams provided in the ACA:  one for beneficiaries eligible for 
pre-ACA Medicaid, and one for beneficiaries newly eligible under post-ACA 
Medicaid.  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion) (contrasting different 
funding streams at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) with § 1396d(y)). 
 396. Of course, the independent grants specified in Parts C and D have their own 
funding streams, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1443–1444 (funding formula and authorization 
under Part C); id. § 1451(c)–(d) (funding for distinct competitive and formula 
grants under Part D), but they are quite obviously different grants, and funding for 
the different Parts are not tied together.  See, e.g., Thomas Hehir, IDEA and 
Disproportionality:  Federal Enforcement, Effective Advocacy, and Strategies for Change, in 
RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 219, 227–28 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield 
eds., 2002) (discussing instance in which several states considered opting out of only 
some IDEA programs). 
 397. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, 
sec. 303, § 623, 100 Stat. 1145, 1161. 
 398. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B). 
PASACHOFF.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2013  1:13 PM 
638 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:577 
law coercive; it would simply require analysis of whether the financial 
terms of the program constitute economic dragooning. 
There is one additional notice issue for the IDEA, not present with 
NCLB, that could be conceivably raised in light of NFIB’s 
reinvigoration of the coercion doctrine:  the issue of so-called “full 
funding.”399  It is often said that when the law was originally passed in 
1975, Congress promised to provide 40% of the extra cost of 
educating a child with a disability,400 as reflected in the formula for 
determining the maximum state entitlement under the Act.401  Yet 
over the decades, the federal government has never come close to 
providing this amount.  For most of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
federal share stayed at around 8%.402  A sizeable increase in funds 
in the last decade more than doubled the federal share, but it 
remains under 20%,403 although a one-time grant under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act temporarily brought 
federal funding close to the 40% goal for one year.404  One could 
imagine an argument that states originally accepted funds under the 
IDEA on the understanding that they were taking on a financial 
burden of a particular size and that the current IDEA, funded at this 
lower level, thus improperly imposes post-acceptance, retroactive 
conditions.  Under this reading, while “the size of the new financial 
burden imposed on a State is irrelevant in analyzing whether the 
State has been coerced into accepting that burden” from the 
perspective of economic dragooning,405 it could theoretically still 
hold some relevance with respect to whether the states had adequate 
notice about the scope of the program’s conditions. 
This argument is not likely to be successful.  Even assuming that 
the state’s financial burden is relevant to the issue of notice, the 
                                                          
 399. Note, however, that this argument would fall under the standard clear 
statement rule for Spending Clause legislation, not under anything new in NFIB. 
 400. Richard N. Apling, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA):  Issues 
Regarding “Full Funding” of Part B Grants to States, in INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUCATION ACT (IDEA):  BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 103, 104 (Nancy Lee Jones et al. eds., 
2004). 
 401. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976). 
 402. Pasachoff, supra note 238, at 27. 
 403. Id. 
 404. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(i) (2006) (showing that the authorization for full funding 
at 40% is approximately $26 billion); DOE SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY FUNDS, supra 
note 327 (listing Recovery Act funds of $11.3 billion and regularly appropriated funds 
of $11.5 billion); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009:  IDEA Recovery Funds for 
Services to Children and Youths with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 1, 2009), 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/idea.html (explaining that 
Recovery Act funds are additional to regularly appropriated funds). 
 405. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 n.12 
(2012) (plurality opinion). 
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statutory text provides no tenable basis for the states to say that they 
relied on a promise of federal funding at 40% in making the decision 
to sign onto the program.  The provision in which the 40% so-called 
full funding is specified is titled “maximum State entitlement,” not 
“eventual state entitlement.”406  The word “maximum” indicates that 
it is the most a state could hope for, not anything to which a state has 
a legal claim.  Further, the original law provided for a ratable 
reduction in the amount actually given to each state if the actual 
sums appropriated for any given fiscal year were less than the 
maximum state entitlement for that year,407 a provision that should 
have made clear to any state the real possibility that funding would 
not reach the 40% level.  Whatever moral obligation may attend the 
40% goal, it presents no problem with respect to notice. 
4. Economic dragooning 
If the sums involved in Title I cannot constitute economic 
dragooning, neither can the sums involved in the IDEA, which is 
second to Title I in federal funding.  Of the total $552 billion dollars 
in federal funds provided to the states in 2010,408 $11.5 billion came 
from IDEA Part B, with another $1 billion coming from Parts C and 
D409—around 2% of all federal allocations to the states410 (as 
compared to 42% for Medicaid).411  Whereas cutting off federal 
Medicaid funding would jeopardize state budgets by over 10%,412 
IDEA Part B spending constitutes only 0.7% of the average state 
budget,413 while the smaller Parts C and D constitute only 0.06%.414  
Even with the temporary $11.3 billion increase in IDEA Part B 
spending under ARRA in 2009415 added to the regularly appropriated 
amount of $11.5 billion, the funding constitutes only 1.4% of all state 
                                                          
 406. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1976). 
 407. Id. § 1411(g). 
 408. NASBO, supra note 30, at 7 tbl.1. 
 409. DOE SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY FUNDS, supra note 327. 
 410. Calculated by dividing $11.5 billion, see id., by $552 billion, see NASBO, supra 
note 30, at 7 tbl.1. 
 411. Calculated by dividing $233 billion in federal Medicaid funding by $552 
billion in overall federal funding.  See NASBO, supra note 30, at 7 tbl.1. 
 412. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012) 
(plurality opinion). 
 413. Calculated by dividing $11.5 billion in IDEA Part B funds for fiscal year 2009, 
see DOE SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY FUNDS, supra note 327, by $1.558 trillion in 
overall state expenditures for fiscal year 2009, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 7, tbl.1. 
 414. Calculated by dividing $1 billion in IDEA Parts C and D Funds for fiscal year 
2009, see DOE SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY FUNDS, supra note 327, by $1.558 trillion in 
overall state expenditures for fiscal year 2009, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 7, tbl.1. 
 415. DOE SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY FUNDS, supra note 327. 
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expenditures.416  And “full funding” of the IDEA Part B—$26 billion 
in 2011417, a sum that has never been provided—would still be only 
1.5% of all state expenditures.418  All of these figures are far closer to 
the amount approved in Dole than to the amount disapproved in 
NFIB. 
A possible counterargument might suggest that, like Medicaid, the 
IDEA is a federal program imposed on states and districts because of 
their failure to act in support of the program’s beneficiaries.  This 
argument would attempt to distinguish the IDEA from NCLB, saying 
that while state constitutions contain the right to education, those 
constitutional rights would not likely encompass the detailed 
substantive and procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA.419  
Therefore, this argument would go, far from merely assisting the 
states in their own task of educating students, the IDEA effectively 
“conscript[s] state [agencies] into the national bureaucratic army,” as 
the NFIB plurality declares the Medicaid expansion would do.420 
But even assuming that the extent to which a program is truly 
federal is relevant to the question of economic dragooning, and even 
assuming a court would be competent to make that determination, 
this argument would implicate the IDEA from its inception in 1975, 
not only the law’s current iteration.  Because neither the NFIB 
plurality nor the joint dissent would have upset the original Medicaid 
program as coercive, the original IDEA would survive as well.  
Moreover, upsetting the IDEA from its inception would also ignore 
the genesis of the IDEA as a historical matter, since the states were 
instrumental in both calling upon Congress to enact the legislation 
and participating in the design of the program.421  It is hard to see 
how the states could have been economically dragooned into a 
                                                          
 416. Calculated by dividing $22.8 billion in IDEA Part B funds and Recovery Act 
IDEA Part B funds, see id., by $1.558 trillion in overall state expenditures for fiscal 
year 2009, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 7, tbl.1. 
 417. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(i)(7) (2006). 
 418. Calculated by dividing $26 billion in IDEA Part B funds authorized for fiscal 
year 2011, see id., by $1.687 trillion in estimated overall state expenditures for fiscal 
year 2011, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 7 tbl.1. 
 419. See Ryan, supra note 76, at 48–49 & 70–71 nn.16–17, 55–56 (observing that 
state constitutions guaranteeing education “provide little detail as to how a state’s 
system of education should be organized” and lack rights specified in the IDEA). 
 420. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07 (2012) 
(plurality opinion) (second alteration in original) (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
 421. See MELNICK, supra note 331, at 148–57 (highlighting the various efforts taken 
by states regarding the legislation, and declaring that “State and local education 
agencies and the two major teachers’ unions supported the effort to increase the 
federal authorization substantially”). 
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program they themselves requested, and which some states took their 
time in joining, apparently having had time to make a reasoned 
decision about its pros and cons.422  The states might prefer federal 
funding in the form of a block grant with little specification on the 
use of that money.  But as the NFIB plurality underscored, Congress 
may “condition the receipt of funds on the States’ complying with 
restrictions on the use of those funds.”423 
Another potential argument that the IDEA represents economic 
dragooning would look to the heightened enforcement mechanisms 
in that law.  The law involves far more than simply the theoretical 
threat of withholding funds, the enforcement mechanism used by 
Medicaid and NCLB.  The IDEA designates three possible labels for 
noncompliant states—“Needs assistance,” “Needs intervention,” and 
“Needs substantial intervention”—with progressively more intrusive 
federal involvement and progressively less discretion offered to the 
Secretary to make the choice of whether and how to penalize a 
noncompliant state.424  Once the Secretary finds that a state needs 
substantial intervention, for example, she must either recover funds 
already issued, withhold funds “in whole or in part,” or refer the case 
either to the Office of the Inspector General at the Department of 
Education or to the Department of Justice for appropriate legal 
action.425 
But NFIB gives no indication that these additional measures are 
material.  If the threat of withholding 100% of funds could on its own 
constitute economic coercion because of the size of the funds at 
                                                          
 422. See id. (describing state support); Alan Gartner & Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky, 
Beyond Special Education:  Toward a Quality System for All Students, in SPECIAL EDUCATION 
FOR A NEW CENTURY 165, 169 (Lauren I. Katzman et al. eds., 2005) (documenting 
gradual implementation).  To be sure, the states also sought federal involvement in 
disposing of the low-level radioactive waste that was the subject of constitutional 
dispute in New York v. United States.  See 505 U.S. 144, 150–51 (1992) (describing the 
role of the National Governors’ Association in developing the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act); Richard C. Kearney, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management:  
Environmental Policy, Federalism, and New York, PUBLIUS, Summer 1993, at 57, 60–61 
(describing the role of the states more generally in developing that Act).  Yet such 
state initiative did not keep the “take title” requirements of the federal Act in 
question from being struck down as “commandeering” under the Tenth 
Amendment.  New York, 505 U.S. at 175–77.  There is an important difference 
between the two types of state requests, however.  In New York, the states had asked 
for help and were given a choice between two federal mandates, which the Court 
called “no choice at all.”  Id. at 176.  In contrast, with respect to the IDEA, the states 
had asked for help and were given a choice between accepting that help, under 
certain conditions, or declining that help, in which case the status quo of state 
control would remain in place.  No federal mandate was at issue. 
 423. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–04 (plurality opinion). 
 424. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e) (2006). 
 425. Id. § 1416(e)(3). 
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stake, there is no reason to think that the threat becomes more 
coercive just because other enforcement mechanisms are also 
available, especially where the plurality and joint dissent both seemed 
to discount the fact that the Secretary had discretion about whether 
and how much to withhold in Medicaid funds.426  In other words, 
because the plurality and joint dissent treated withholding discretion 
as if it were mandatory, the fact that the IDEA involves some 
mandatory enforcement mechanisms upon certain findings would 
not likely raise any further concerns.  And again, the NFIB opinions 
suggest no problem with the basic conclusion that Congress can 
impose conditions in exchange for its funds, and if it can impose 
conditions, it can surely enforce those conditions in some way.  Not 
even the joint dissent suggested that the mere availability of a threat 
to withhold funds was coercive; it was the amount at stake that the 
joint dissent found so troubling.427 
As with NCLB, then, the NFIB analysis does not undermine the 
sufficiency of the IDEA as Spending Clause legislation. 
C. Conditions Applying to All Federal Education Funding 
1. Background and history of coercion analysis 
NCLB and the IDEA are the main federal education laws that 
govern public schools, providing funding for states and districts in 
exchange for the states’ and districts’ agreement to fulfill the laws’ 
conditions.  There is another set of federal education laws that do not 
provide any funding on their own, but instead apply to any institution 
receiving federal funding (what Professor Bagenstos calls “cross-
cutting conditions”428).  The civil rights laws that govern public 
schools (and private schools accepting federal money) fall into this 
category, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race (under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964429), sex (under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972430), and disability status (under 
                                                          
 426. Cf. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 n.27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring 
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Total withdrawal is what the 
Secretary may, not must, do.  She has discretion to withhold only a portion of the 
Medicaid funds otherwise due a noncompliant State.”). 
 427. Id. at 2661–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(evaluating the serious financial burdens that states would endure if federal funds 
were withheld under the Medicaid expansion program). 
 428. Bagenstos, supra note 109 (manuscript at 53). 
 429. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, §§ 601–605, 78 Stat. 241, 252–53 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7 (2006)). 
 430. Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, §§ 901–907, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006)). 
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973431).  Also falling into 
this category is the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(FERPA), which governs the disclosure of “education records.”432  
Another example of this type of law is the Act providing for the 
observation of Constitution Day, requiring every educational 
institution receiving federal money to “hold an educational program 
on the United States Constitution” each September.433  Failure to 
comply with these laws may result in a loss of federal funding,434 
although in practice, such funding is almost never terminated.435 
In recent years, courts have begun to consider the extent to which 
these laws are coercive under the Spending Clause, on the grounds 
that the amount of federal money at stake for noncompliance is so 
large as to leave the recipients with no actual choice but to comply.436  
                                                          
 431. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 794 (2006)).  Title IX is limited to educational programs and activities receiving 
federal funding, but Title VI and Section 504 apply to any program and activity 
receiving federal funding.  Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  Because of the similarities in their language, these statutes are 
often interpreted in tandem.  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of 
Am., 477 U.S. 597, 600 n.4 (1986) (explaining that because “Title VI is the 
congressional model for subsequently enacted statutes prohibiting discrimination in 
federally assisted programs or activities . . . [w]e have relied on caselaw interpreting 
Title VI as generally applicable to later statutes”). 
 432. Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513, 88 Stat. 484, 571–74 (codified as amended at 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g (2006)). 
 433. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 111, 118 Stat. 
2809, 3344 (2004). 
 434. In addition to enforcement through agency action to withhold federal funds, 
the civil rights laws may be enforced through judicially implied private rights of 
action.  No such private lawsuit may be brought to enforce FERPA, however.  See 
Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–85 (2002) (contrasting Title VI and Title IX with 
FERPA).  There is no enforcement language attached to the Act requiring the 
observation of Constitution Day, leading some commentators to suggest that any 
attempt to cut off funds for failure to comply could lead to a successful Spending 
Clause challenge on notice grounds.  See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Is Constitution Day 
Unconstitutional?, 9 GREEN BAG 2D, 247, 251–52 (2006) (noting that “the statute does 
not seem to specify any penalty for noncompliance” and questioning the outcome if 
the government tried to enforce the statute). 
 435. See Lynn M. Daggett, FERPA in the Twenty-First Century:  Failure To Effectively 
Regulate Privacy for All Students, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 64 n.30 (2008) (noting that 
the Department of Education has never terminated a school district’s federal funds 
for failure to comply with FERPA); see also Julie A. Davies & Lisa M. Bohon, Re-
imagining Public Enforcement of Title IX, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25, 69–70 (“Title VI and 
Title IX possessed a very strong enforcement mechanism from the outset—funding 
cut-off—but its draconian nature has meant that the enforcing agencies are reluctant 
to use it.”). 
 436. See, e.g., Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the 
argument that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is coercive); see also Jim 
C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081–82 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (concluding 
that Section 504 is not coercive because states may choose to “either give up federal 
aid to education, or agree that the Department of Education can be sued under 
Section 504”); see also Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of the Defendant-Appellant 
University of Illinois Board of Trustees and Reversal of the District Court at 6–7, Chi. 
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NFIB will surely reinvigorate these arguments.437  Because there is a 
more plausible case to be made that at least some of these laws 
represent separate programs for which no adequate notice was given, 
and because the amount of money involved is much higher than for 
Title I or the IDEA individually, NFIB presents a more serious issue 
for the cross-cutting conditions than it does for those narrower laws. 
As I show below, however, I do not think that any of the laws will 
ultimately be doomed to failure under NFIB.  Even the higher 
amount of money involved by adding together all federal education 
programs pales in comparison to the amount of federal money at 
stake in the Medicaid expansion.  This argument thus underscores 
my larger conclusion that conditional spending in the regulatory 
state after NFIB will remain essentially unscathed. 
2. Old funding conditioned on compliance with a new program 
The question of whether the civil rights laws, FERPA, and the 
Constitution Day law merely govern the use of federal funds or 
instead constitute independent programs that threaten to take away 
other funds for noncompliance poses a different challenge than this 
question does for NCLB and the IDEA.  For NCLB and the IDEA, the 
                                                          
Tribune Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 680 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-
2066), 2011 WL 3283769, at *6–7 (arguing that compliance with FERPA is not a 
choice because of the amount of federal funding involved). 
Some cases additionally consider whether Section 504 can be justified under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit 
Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1175–77 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Bradley v. 
Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, 756 (8th Cir. 1999).  As with the IDEA, see supra 
notes 353–57 and accompanying text, the fate of Section 504 under the Spending 
Clause is particularly important to its continued existence, as only Title VI and Title 
IX are likely to be separately sustained under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Section 504 is likely not, at least not in all of its applications.  See 
Bagenstos, supra note 109 (manuscript at 55–58).  And in the absence of a protected 
class or a fundamental right, there is no credible case that FERPA or Constitution 
Day could be valid Section 5 legislation, just as NCLB could not be.  See Ryan, supra 
note 76, at 48–49 & 70 nn.16 (explaining that NCLB cannot be sustained under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
Commentators have raised a separate question about the constitutionality of 
Constitution Day, asking whether the requirement to celebrate the Constitution is an 
unconstitutional condition under the First Amendment.  See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, 
Op-Ed., Happy Illegal Holiday!, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, at A21.  As NFIB adds 
nothing to this discussion, I do not explore it here. 
 437. See Bagenstos, supra note 109 (manuscript at 55) (stating that NFIB will provoke 
a new round of challenges to Section 504); see also Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., Happy 
(Un)constitution(al) Day, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (Sept. 19, 2012, 9:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/happy-unconstitutional-day 
(asking whether NFIB renders Constitution Day unconstitutional); Frank D. LoMonte, 
Federal Privacy Law Should Be Deemed Unconstitutional, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 13, 2012, 
2:59 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2012/09/13/federal-privacy-law-
should-be-deemed-unconstitutional-essay (arguing that FERPA is “indistinguishable” 
from the Medicaid expansion and should be struck down as coercive). 
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question is whether anything internal to those laws is separate 
enough to be considered an independent program, like the Medicaid 
expansion’s relationship to pre-ACA Medicaid.  For these cross-
cutting conditions, the question is whether they are best understood 
as governing the use of federal funds even though they exist 
externally to the programs on whose funds they are justified.  In 
other words, may they be considered conditions that govern the use 
of these funds even though they appear in different places in the U.S. 
Code, are reauthorized (if at all) on different schedules from the laws 
that provide funding, and so on? 
One might be tempted to conclude that these laws are 
independent programs because they are pressuring the states to 
make policy changes.  But this causal connection cannot be right; as I 
indicated above, even conditions governing the use of spending can 
be framed as pressuring the states to make policy changes, while 
these laws could just as well be framed as designed to promote the 
general welfare (in ensuring nondiscrimination, protecting student 
privacy, and developing civics education).  The NFIB plurality’s 
distinction between ensuring the general welfare and pressuring the 
states to make policy changes is hard to sustain, but that distinction 
was offered as a justification, not a definition of the difference 
between conditions that govern the use of federal funds and 
conditions that threaten to take away funds from an independent 
program.  The mere possibility that these laws encourage the states to 
make policy changes cannot on its own be enough to make them a 
separate program. 
One might instead argue that these laws are independent 
programs because they have goals that are different from the 
sources of funding on which they rely.  NCLB is about ensuring 
access to a high-quality education, for example, not about 
antidiscrimination or student privacy;438 the IDEA is about 
providing appropriate education to children with disabilities, not 
about celebrating the Constitution.439  But this is a level-of-
generality game; one could just as easily respond that Congress 
believed that one way to ensure access to a high-quality education, 
or appropriate education for children with disabilities, was to 
ensure that schools operate free from discrimination, children’s 
                                                          
 438. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006) (“The purpose of this title is to ensure that all 
children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality 
education . . . .”). 
 439. See id. § 1400(d)(4) (establishing that the IDEA’s purpose is “to assess, and 
ensure the effectiveness of, efforts to educate children with disabilities”). 
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privacy is protected, and children learn something about the 
Constitution. 
A better reading, it seems to me, is that these conditions do, in fact, 
constitute conditions on the use of federal dollars.  These conditions 
tell states that when they spend federal education money, they should 
do so in non-discriminatory ways, and some of this money should be 
spent to protect student privacy and teach about the Constitution.440  
Any of these Acts could be revised and included as part of at least 
some federal education programs without difficulty, and there is 
nothing in NFIB that suggests that it would be necessary for Congress 
to do so in order for them to be sustained.441  Of course separate 
funds could be attached to these conditions, and, like the Medicaid 
expansion, or like the different programs under the aegis of NCLB, 
then they would be independent programs.  But without separate 
funding, these conditions are best read as governing the use of the 
funds on which they rely for their existence. 
It is helpful in this regard to consider cross-cutting conditions that 
might be placed on all federal education funding without additional 
money that would constitute independent programs, like the 
condition at issue in Dole.  Imagine, for example, a law providing that 
federal education money may not flow to jurisdictions in which bus 
depots are located within 500 feet of a school (in order to limit child 
asthma), or that federal education money may flow only to 
jurisdictions that include in their zoning laws an examination of the 
percentage of children receiving free or reduced-price school lunch 
in determining where to zone supermarkets (in order to promote 
child nutrition).  Neither of these laws would govern the use of the 
education dollars and therefore would, under the NFIB plurality’s 
analysis, constitute a condition threatening to take away funds from 
independent programs.  The cross-cutting conditions at issue in the 
civil rights laws, FERPA, and Constitution Day are quite different 
from these two examples, in that the conduct they require uses the 
federal dollars in question in some way. 
If the cross-cutting conditions at issue here are like the conditions 
within NCLB and the IDEA in that they govern the use of education 
dollars, then the next question is whether these conditions 
themselves have been so significantly modified that they constitute a 
                                                          
 440. See Bagenstos, supra note 109 (manuscript at 56) (agreeing that the 
conditions are “best understood as merely governing the use of the funds that 
Congress has provided to the states under particular spending programs”). 
 441. Id. (manuscript at 57) (recognizing that the legal effect of these cross-cutting 
conditions would remain the same if implemented in individual acts). 
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different program from their original instantiation, as the significant 
transformation of the Medicaid expansion did with respect to pre-
ACA Medicaid.442  Very few changes to the civil rights laws have been 
made over the years, however.  One addition dating to 1986 
provides that states lack sovereign immunity from suit in federal 
court for violation of these and other acts banning discrimination 
by recipients of federal funding.443  But this expansion of remedy 
seems less “a shift in kind” and more like an “expan[sion of] the 
boundaries” of the law’s categories. 444  FERPA has been subject to a 
number of modifications, but they have largely tweaked definitions 
and added exceptions.445  And the law providing for Constitution 
Day has never been modified.  The cross-cutting conditions should 
therefore not even proceed to the rest of the plurality’s coercion 
analysis, because as conditions governing the use of funds, they 
should survive on their own. 
3. Notice to the states 
If I am wrong that the cross-cutting conditions are more properly 
understood as conditions on the use of federal dollars rather than 
independent programs conditioned on other programs’ funds, then 
the question arises of whether the states had sufficient notice that 
they would have to comply with these other programs when they first 
took education funding. 
For the civil rights laws and FERPA, the answer should be yes.  The 
ESEA of 1965 postdates the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and therefore 
Title VI, while the IDEA of 1975 additionally postdates Title IX, 
Section 504, and FERPA.  Therefore, the states signed onto the two 
largest sources of federal education money with the knowledge that 
they would also have to comply with these other laws. 
The Constitution Day law is another matter.  The provision 
requiring that schools observe Constitution Day dates only to 2005, 
when Senator Byrd included this requirement as an attachment to a 
consolidated appropriations bill.446  If Constitution Day is, like the 
                                                          
 442. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605–07 
(2012) (plurality opinion) (comparing the modifications in the Medicaid expansion 
with pre-ACA Medicaid). 
 443. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 
1807, 1845 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (2006)). 
 444. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (plurality opinion); cf. supra note 379 and 
accompanying text. 
 445. See generally Legislative History of Major FERPA Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 
(June 2002), http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/ferpaleghistory.pdf 
(describing statutory changes to FERPA over time). 
 446. See Greenhouse, supra note 437. 
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Medicaid expansion, an independent program requiring its 
acceptance upon the threat of losing other federal funding, then the 
notice required by the NFIB plurality clearly does not exist.447  Then 
the question becomes whether the financial terms of the deal 
constitute economic dragooning. 
4. Economic dragooning 
Federal education funding plays a significantly smaller role in state 
budgets than does federal Medicaid funding.  As the joint dissent 
noted, “[t]he States are far less reliant on federal funding for any 
other program,” including “aid to support elementary and secondary 
education,” which, the joint dissent recognized, is “[a]fter Medicaid, 
the next biggest federal funding item.”448  Of the $552 billion the 
federal government provided to the states in 2010, over $233 billion, 
or 42%, went to Medicaid.449  A much smaller figure, $70 billion, or 
12.8%, of this $552 billion went to elementary and secondary 
education.450  Medicaid spending accounts for over 20% of the 
average state’s annual budget, of which the federal share ranges from 
50 to 83%, with an average of 64%.451  Elementary and secondary 
education spending also constitutes about 20% of the average state’s 
annual budget, but the federal share of this spending is only about 
21%.452  While federal funding provides an average of 64% of all 
Medicaid dollars, because Medicaid is a joint federal-state program, 
federal funding only provides around 9.6% of all spending on 
elementary and secondary education, because localities provide 
significant amounts of all spending on education.453  Finally, as the 
plurality explained, federal Medicaid dollars represent a minimum of 
10% of the states’ overall budgets454; federal education spending 
represents significantly less. 
                                                          
 447. To be sure, there is also a colorable argument that a threat to withhold such 
funds would fail the typical rule for notice in Spending Clause programs, completely 
aside from any coercion inquiry, because there is no clear enforcement mechanism 
for this law.  See Lund, supra note 434, at 251–52 (“The Amendment says that schools 
that receive federal funding ‘shall hold’ a Constitution Day program, but the statute 
does not seem to specify any penalty for noncompliance.”). 
 448. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id.; NASBO, supra note 30, at 16 tbl.7. 
 451. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (plurality opinion); id. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 452. NASBO, supra note 30, at 5, 14.  
 453. See THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2012-001, 
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2011, at 258 tbl.181 (2012) [hereinafter DIGEST]. 
 454. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (plurality opinion) (calling this 10% “economic 
dragooning”). 
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How much less?  In fiscal year 2010, the year whose data the NFIB 
Court examined for Medicaid spending,455 when the state least 
affected by federal Medicaid funds still relied on these funds for 10% 
of its state expenditures,456 the state least affected by federal funds for 
elementary and secondary education relied on these funds for only 
1.2% of its state expenditures.457  In that same year, the average state 
relied on federal Medicaid dollars for 14% of its state expenditures,458 
while the average state relied on federal dollars for elementary and 
secondary education for 4.4% of its state expenditures.459  And in that 
same year, the state most affected by federal Medicaid dollars relied 
on those dollars for over 16.6% of its state expenditures,460 while the 
state most affected by federal dollars for elementary and secondary 
education relied on those dollars for 7.5% of its state expenditures.461  
                                                          
 455. See id. at 2604–05 (citing NASBO, supra note 30); see also id. at 2663 (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (same). 
 456. Id. at 2604–05 (plurality opinion).  I use the 10% figure here—the minimum 
of 50% of federal funding of the 20% of the average state’s budget devoted to 
Medicaid—because the plurality found it of constitutional significance.  In fact, in 
2010, the state that relied on federal Medicaid spending the least faced a 4.7% loss of 
its budget if that amount were lost (calculated by dividing $363 million in federal 
Medicaid funds to Wyoming, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 47 tbl.28, by $7.657 billion 
in Wyoming’s annual state overall expenditures, see id. at 7 tbl.1).  Even if this 
minimum number is lower than the figure the plurality discussed, though, the fact 
remains that federal Medicaid spending overall plays a crucially different role in state 
budgets than does federal education funding, as the next few paragraphs make clear. 
 457. Calculated by dividing $93 million in federal education funds to Wyoming, see 
NASBO, supra note 30, at 16 tbl.7, by $7.657 billion in Wyoming’s annual state 
overall expenditures, see id. at 7 tbl.1. 
 458. Calculated by dividing 20% in the average state budget that Medicaid 
spending represents by the average of 64.6% that is the federal share nationwide.  See 
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) 
(providing these figures).  The NASBO report for 2010 reaches a similar figure of 
14.4%.  Calculated by dividing $233.633 billion in federal Medicaid funds to the 
states, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 47 tbl.28, by $1.621 trillion in the states’ 
combined annual expenditures, see id. at 7 tbl.1. 
 459. Calculated by dividing $70.768 billion in federal education funds to all of the 
states, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 16 tbl.7, by $1.621 trillion in annual state overall 
expenditures, see id. at 7 tbl.1. 
 460. Calculated by dividing 20% in the average state budget that Medicaid 
spending represents by the statutory high of 83% that is the federal government’s 
share.  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (plurality opinion) (providing these figures).  
The actual percentages for federal Medicaid spending provided in the NASBO 
Report are even higher, with five states relying on federal Medicaid funds for over 
20% of their budgets.  See NASBO, supra note 30, at 7 tbl.1, 47 tbl.28 (reporting 
figures that place Maine, New York, Missouri, Tennessee, and Arizona in this 
category). 
 461. Calculated by dividing $7 billion in federal education funds to Texas and 
$3 billion in federal education funds to Georgia, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 16 
tbl.7, by, respectively, $93 billion in Texas’s annual state overall expenditures and 
$40 billion in Georgia’s annual state overall expenditures, see id. at 7 tbl.1. 
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Even this high figure (relevant to only two states) is less than the 
10% of state expenditures that so concerned the NFIB Court.462 
Moreover, fiscal year 2010 was an outlier year, a year of particularly 
high federal spending as a result of the short-term funds provided in 
the Recovery Act.463  In fiscal year 2009, when Recovery Act funds first 
started to make their way through state budgets,464 the average 
percentage of state expenditures represented by federal funds for 
elementary and secondary education was lower:  3.6%,465 with a high 
of 6.8%.466  And in fiscal year 2008, a year that typified pre-recession 
federal-state spending relationships, the average was still lower, at 
3.1%,467 with a high of 5.2%.468 
To be sure, the average of 3% or 4% is not nothing, and it is 
certainly higher than the percentage of the state budget at stake in 
Dole, as approved by both the plurality and joint dissent in NFIB.469  
But the differences with Medicaid are stark. 
Indeed, the joint dissent—representing the four justices who 
would be most likely to push the coercion doctrine further—
seemed quite taken with the significant difference in the amount of 
federal education funding as compared to federal Medicaid 
funding.  The joint dissent several times referred to federal 
education funding and its percentage of state budgets as “only” what 
it represented overall or in a particular state.470  In emphasizing 
what an outlier Medicaid is, the joint dissent further noted that 
“even in States with less than average federal Medicaid funding, that 
funding is at least twice the size of federal education funding as a 
percentage of state expenditures.”471 
                                                          
 462. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (plurality opinion). 
 463. See NASBO, supra note 30, at 2 (describing effect of the Recovery Act on 
federal and state spending). 
 464. Id. 
 465. Calculated by dividing $56.437 billion in federal education funds to all of the 
states, see NASBO, supra note 30, at 16 tbl.7, by $1.558 trillion in annual state overall 
expenditures, see id. at 7 tbl.1. 
 466. Calculated by dividing $6233 billion in federal education funds to Texas, see 
NASBO, supra note 30, at 16 tbl.7, by $92.296 billion in Texas’s annual state overall 
expenditures, see id. at 7 tbl.1. 
 467. Calculated by dividing $45.401 billion in federal education funds to the states, 
see NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, FISCAL YEAR 2009 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 
16 tbl.7 (2010), available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2009-State-
Expenditure-Report.pdf, by $1.478 trillion in annual state overall state expenditures, 
see id. at 6 tbl.1. 
 468. Calculated by dividing $4.189 billion in federal education funds to Texas, see id. at 
16 tbl.7, by $81.097 billion in Texas’s annual state overall expenditures, see id. at 6 tbl.1. 
 469. See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
 470. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 471. Id. at 2664. 
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Moreover, federal education dollars occupy a different space in the 
political landscape than do federal Medicaid dollars.  The NFIB 
plurality and joint dissent essentially focused on the devastation that 
the loss of federal Medicaid dollars would mean to the average state’s 
budget.  Yet calls to abolish the federal Department of Education, 
and with that abolition all or most federal education dollars, are a 
common rallying cry for conservatives.472  It would be difficult to 
suggest that federal education dollars are too large for states to turn 
down and at the same time suggest that the states would be fine 
without federal education dollars.  This reality—while obviously not a 
matter of legal doctrine—would likely affect the size of a politically 
inflected legal movement to undermine the civil rights laws as 
unconstitutional, and might therefore influence the Court.473 
There are thus very good reasons to think that the laws 
conditioned on all federal education funding fall within “the 
outermost line where persuasion gives way to coercion.”474 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF CONDITIONAL SPENDING IN 
FEDERAL EDUCATION LAW AND MORE 
The previous analysis demonstrates why NFIB is not likely to spell 
the undoing of federal education law and with it the rest of 
conditional spending in the regulatory state.  There are, nonetheless, 
some broader implications of NFIB for the future of federal 
education law and, by extension, other similar spending programs.  
In this Part, I consider these implications in three different domains:  
federal courts, Congress, and federal agencies.  I suggest that the 
largest effects are not likely to be doctrinal but instead legislative (in 
the size and design of spending programs) and administrative (in the 
implementation and enforcement of these programs). 
A. Courts 
I have already explained why I think application of the tests set 
forth in the plurality and joint dissent is unlikely to affect many other 
                                                          
 472. See Alyson Klein, Romney’s VP Pick Puts K-12 Spending on Campaign Stage, EDUC. 
WK., Aug. 28, 2012, at 24, 24–27 (discussing U.S. Rep. Paul Ryan’s controversial budget 
blueprint and his position on federal education funding); see also Morgan Smith, What 
Would Happen if Dept. of Education Were Closed?, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 11, 2011), 
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-education/public-education/what-would-it-mean-
abolish-education (highlighting popular Republicans who have expressed support for 
abolishing the Department of Education). 
 473. Cf. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (noting that “more than half the States [have] brought this lawsuit, 
contending that the offer is coercive”). 
 474. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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existing federal-state programs if states were to challenge them on 
coercion grounds in court.  The plurality would find coercion only 
where acceptance of a new program is belatedly tied to an older 
program, the loss of which funding would constitute a significant 
burden on the state budget.475  The joint dissent would go further, 
finding coercion either in the threat to withdraw significant amounts 
of federal funding from the state budget or in offers of new money in 
such high amounts that states would be practically limited in their 
ability to pay for replacement programs with their own taxes.476  As I 
have argued, Medicaid funding is so far beyond other spending 
programs that neither of these tests is likely to affect much other 
funding to the states. 
One way that courts could conceivably push the coercion doctrine 
further is to apply it to entities other than the states—for example, at 
the school district or city level, or to private universities, research 
labs, health clinics, or individuals receiving federal funds.477  Will 
lower courts extend the coercion inquiry to these entities by, say, 
examining the percentage of their budgets that federal funding 
represents? 
There are several reasons why I think this is unlikely.  First, the 
rationales offered in NFIB for finding coercion were strongly rooted 
in the idea that the states are sovereign entities with independent 
constitutional rights under the Tenth Amendment.478  The concerns 
about commandeering,479 “our system of federalism,”480 “invad[ing] 
the states’ jurisdiction,”481 “the unique role of the States in our 
system,”482 respect for “the legislative processes of the States,”483 the 
                                                          
 475. See supra Part I.C. 
 476. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 477. Compare Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 382–83 (suggesting that it would be difficult 
to limit a more stringent version of the coercion test to states alone and that any such 
test would likely apply to private entities as well), LoMonte, supra note 437 (suggesting 
that NFIB’s coercion analysis should apply to private universities), and Feder & 
Samuelsohn, supra note 16 (suggesting that school districts may bring coercion claims 
in the wake of NFIB), with Emily J. Martin, Title IX and the New Spending Clause, AM. 
CONST. SOCIETY FOR L. & POL’Y 7 (Dec. 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default 
/files/Martin_-_Title_IX_and_the_New_Spending_Clause_1.pdf (questioning whether 
coercion claims are available to local governments). 
 478. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion); id. at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 479. Id. at 2602 (plurality opinion); id. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 480. Id. at 2602 (plurality opinion). 
 481. Id. at 2659 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 482. Id. at 2660 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 483. Id. 
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accountability of state officials,484 the dangers of “coopt[ing] the 
States’ political processes,”485 “the practical ability of States to collect 
their own taxes,”486 and so on were crucial to the articulation of the 
justification for a robust coercion inquiry.  These concerns simply do 
not have the same traction with entities other than the states, whose 
existence is not part of the core constitutional compact on which the 
country’s existence depends. 
In the context of education law, this point seems particularly 
important, as the other most relevant entity—local school districts—
have no meaningful constitutional authority over education, whether 
at the state level or at the federal level.  As Professor Ryan explains: 
There is a popular belief that public schools are locally controlled.  
As a legal matter, this has always been something of a myth.  Local 
control exists only insofar as states are willing to delegate authority, 
and even then localities can control only what a state lets them 
control.  As a practical matter, it is becoming more difficult to 
identify many, if any, areas over which local school boards retain 
exclusive or significant control.487 
In fact, “states have absolute authority over education” under state 
constitutions.488  The question of whether the federal government is 
coercing local school districts by offering them money or by 
threatening to take away money, then, seems something of a 
sideshow.  It is perfectly consistent to be concerned about the federal 
government coercing the states and not worried about the federal 
government coercing local school districts, because local school districts 
answer to the states through whose coffers most federal education 
money flows. 489 
Second, the “endless difficulties” traditionally associated with the 
coercion inquiry seem particularly trenchant in this context.490  When 
the question is whether the states are being coerced, there is a 
rationale for looking at the effect of the federal funds on the state 
budget as a whole to assess whether states have a practical choice 
                                                          
 484. Id. at 2603 (plurality opinion); id. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, 
JJ., dissenting). 
 485. Id. at 2661 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 486. Id. at 2662 n.13. 
 487. Ryan, supra note 76, at 60. 
 488. Id.; see also Heise, supra note 60, at 130–32 (discussing the “illusion of local 
control” that has “not accurately described the reality of American education policy 
for decades”). 
 489. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6312(a) (2006) (describing process for states to issue 
subgrants to local educational agencies under NCLB); id. § 1411(f) (describing process 
for states to issue subgrants to local education agencies under the IDEA).   
 490. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937)). 
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whether to accept funds or new conditions.  When the question is 
whether school districts are being coerced, it is much less clear whose 
budget is the proper denominator.  Is it the school district’s own 
budget?  The budget of the jurisdiction in which the school district 
sits?  The state budget?  The answer to this question would matter a 
great deal as to the percentage of the budget the federal funds 
represents, but there are reasons to argue for the appropriateness of 
each possibility.  And with over 13,000 school districts in the 
country,491 with varying relationships to larger sub-state jurisdictions 
and their states, as well as with varying relationships to federal 
funds—even assuming one denominator is selected—there is likely to 
be a wide variety of answers,492 resulting in a very messy set of 
inconsistent outcomes that judges may be loathe to invite. 
As for other non-state entities, there is no more reason to focus on 
the relationship of federal funding to the entities’ own bottom-line 
budgets, which are to some extent malleable and within the entities’ 
control, and as to which judges are likely to be less deferential than to 
the budgets of sovereign states.  A health clinic facing the loss of 
federal funds may step up its fundraising from private parties.  A 
university may, in addition to increasing fundraising, draw down a 
higher percentage of an endowment, delay capital projects, trim back 
expensive but tangential programs, increase tuition, or admit more 
students.  A voucher recipient may get another job.  There is 
therefore a rational reason to limit the NFIB coercion inquiry to the 
state level. 
Finally, there is reason to think that more conservative judges who 
might be inclined to be sympathetic to the joint dissent’s analysis as 
applied to the states will nonetheless want to seek limits on the 
coercion inquiry.  Federal conditional spending often promotes 
substantive goals that are traditionally conservative in nature—
requiring the military to be permitted to recruit on college campuses, 
limiting abortions in health clinics, placing work requirements on 
welfare recipients, and the like—that judges may wish not to 
undercut.493  And, as Professor Bagenstos has noted, taking 
metaphysical notions of coercion seriously is more in keeping with a 
liberal doctrinal approach than a conservative one.494 
                                                          
 491. DIGEST, supra note 453, at 135 tbl.91. 
 492. See Jennifer Cohen Kabaker, Ryan Proposed Budget Cuts Could Mean Millions Lost for 
Some Districts, ED MONEY WATCH (Sept. 5, 2012), http://edmoney.newamerica.net 
/blogposts/2012/ryan_proposed_budget_cuts_could_mean_millions_lost_for_some_dist
ricts-70939 (describing wide variety in districts’ reliance on federal education funding). 
 493. Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 383. 
 494. Id. at 383–84. 
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Keeping the focus on states as the locus of concern for the 
revitalized coercion doctrine, because of the constitutional status of 
the states, thus seems both likely and principled. 
B. Congress 
Four types of legislative responses to the new coercion doctrine 
seem likely to me.  First, the willingness of the Court to find coercion 
in the terms of the Medicaid expansion should dampen any effort for 
the federal government to provide significantly more education 
funding to the states.  The greater the share of federal funding and 
the greater the effect on the states’ budgets, the more likely it is that 
a program could be deemed to constitute economic dragooning 
under NFIB, at least under the joint dissent’s more expansive analysis.  
This implication thus weakens the call to fully fund the IDEA, for an 
estimated increase of around $15 billion annually.495  It weakens the 
justification to provide sufficient federal funding to cover the 
increased expectations under NCLB, for an estimated increase of 
around $28 billion annually.496  And it weakens the argument to 
expand the federal role in education in order to reduce inter-state 
spending disparities, which one estimate placed at $30 billion in new 
annual spending.497  Even if these increases individually would not 
approach the figures found coercive in NFIB,498 collectively they could 
start to jeopardize the cross-cutting conditions, which rely on the sum 
of all federal education dollars combined.  It is unlikely Congress will 
want to take this risk, and scholars and advocates (myself included) 
who have previously argued in favor of more federal funding for 
education should think seriously before reiterating those arguments.  
Ironically, then, one legislative effect of NFIB may be to encourage 
the underfunding of cooperative spending programs. 
                                                          
 495. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 364, at 1482–83 (discussing the bi-partisan 
movement to fully fund special education programs); Pasachoff, supra note 238, at 
28 (pointing out the bi-partisan effort to increase federal special education 
funding by 40%). 
 496. See, e.g., Mathis, supra note 239, at 96 (analyzing what full funding of NCLB 
would mean); No Child Left Behind Funding, FED. EDUC. BUDGET PROJECT (Apr. 4, 2012, 
3:06 PM), http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/no-child-left-behind-
funding (discussing the difference between authorization levels and appropriation 
levels in determining full funding of NCLB). 
 497. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 2044, 2119–24 (2006) (recommending a “power-equalizing foundation 
program” using the formula for federal Medicaid spending as a model); see also  
MAKING MONEY MATTER:  FINANCING AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 261 (Helen F. Ladd & Janet 
S. Hansen eds., 1999) (making a similar proposal). 
 498. See, e.g., supra note 418 (noting that full funding of the IDEA would still 
constitute only 1.5% of average state expenditures). 
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In the current economic and political climate, however, it is 
unlikely that an increase of tens of billions of dollars in new federal 
education money was on the immediate horizon.499  This first 
implication may therefore be of more rhetorical than practical 
relevance, at least in the short term.  The second legislative 
implication of NFIB is of greater practical relevance, then:  Because 
large federal grant programs—particularly those of an ongoing 
duration on which states have come to rely—are more likely to be 
subject to challenge, smaller, more time-limited grant programs 
might begin to proliferate.  In this respect, the Race to the Top 
program—the Obama administration’s signature education 
program500—provides one model of what the future might bring501:  a 
competitive grant program of explicitly limited duration that 
nonetheless requires significant state action in exchange for new 
funds, for which the states have already demonstrated they are 
capable of deciding whether to apply.502 
Because the NFIB joint dissent expressed disquiet about forcing 
nonparticipating states to have their citizens fund through tax dollars 
the rejected program in other states,503 these competitions are not 
without coercion potential.  But the size of the program mattered 
significantly to the joint dissent,504 so keeping these competitive 
programs relatively small should allay those concerns.505  So, too, 
should a focus on funding entities smaller than states.  For example, 
after the first round of Race to the Top applications for states, the 
next round of Race to the Top applications was for districts.506  This 
                                                          
 499. This climate is why I do not think that complete federalization of education 
and other programs that fit the cooperative federalism model is a likely 
congressional response, although, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out, Congress could 
have established Medicaid as “an exclusively federal program” in 1965 just as it did 
Medicare.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2633 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting 
in part); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 464 
(2011) (arguing that Congress has the power to federalize programs like Medicaid). 
 500. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 97, at 590–92 (describing Race to the Top). 
 501. Cf. Mike Johnston, From Regulation to Results:  Shifting American Education from 
Inputs to Outcomes, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 195, 206–07 (2011) (proposing that 
reauthorization of NCLB include more competitive grants like Race to the Top that 
are, among other things, “entirely voluntary”). 
 502. See, e.g., Michele McNeil, All But 10 States Throw Hats Into Race to Top Ring, EDUC. 
WK. (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/01/20/19rtt_ep.h29. 
 503. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–62 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 504. Id. at 2662–63. 
 505. Race to the Top, for example, provides only around $5 billion overall, spread 
over several years and different rounds of competition.  Metzger, supra note 97, at 591–92. 
 506. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Educ., Education Department Invites Districts 
To Apply for $400 Million Race to the Top Competition To Support Classroom-
Level Reform Efforts (Aug. 12, 2012), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press- 
releases/education-department-invites-districts-apply-400-million-race-top-competition-su. 
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move, too, plausibly represents the wave of the future, as the federal 
government bypasses the states out of concern (or respect) for their 
sovereignty.507 
The adoption of these new types of grant programs will not end 
Congress’s need to attend to its large spending programs of long 
duration, however.  The third legislative implication of NFIB, then, is 
that Congress should structure new funding conditions carefully 
when reauthorizing laws such as the IDEA or NCLB, or when 
considering a new cross-cutting law such as the Student Non-
Discrimination Act, which would prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.508  It would be a mistake to think that any new 
condition on spending or modification of old conditions will be 
stopped in its tracks as necessarily coercive; indeed, the nonpartisan 
Congressional Research Service issued a report after the opinion 
came down advising members and committees of Congress that NFIB 
does not affect Congress’s ability to attach or modify conditions to its 
spending.509  Instead, Congress will likely simply try to ensure that its 
reauthorizations do not condition sums of money for one program 
on compliance with another. 
Congress could do this in a number of ways.  When introducing a 
new condition that is arguably significant enough to be considered a 
separate program, it could attach a separate funding stream and 
make applying for it entirely discretionary.  The preschool grants 
introduced to the IDEA in 1986 provide one example of this 
model.510  Alternatively, Congress could introduce a significant new 
condition as part of the older program without providing a new 
funding stream, instead making formal findings about why the new 
condition does not represent a shift in kind but merely an expansion 
of the boundaries of the already existing conditions.  Here, the 
example is the type of findings courts examine to determine if 
legislation enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
“congruent and proportional” to the substantive wrong under 
                                                          
 507. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 97, at 592–93 (describing how Race to the Top 
and other Recovery Act programs “break open state governments” by targeting 
localities instead of states); cf. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2632 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (observing that 
“[t]he alternative to conditional federal spending . . . is not state autonomy but 
state marginalization”). 
 508. Student Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 998, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 509. KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42367, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF FEDERAL GRANT CONDITIONS AFTER NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS 
V. SEBELIUS 14 (2012). 
 510. See supra notes 397–98 and accompanying text. 
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Section 1.511  Another possibility would be for Congress to formally 
repeal the older version of a program and to reenact a new version 
with the significant new condition included as one unified program.  
The NFIB plurality indicated that such a formal repeal-and-
reenactment might be satisfactory, though impractical.512  Of course, 
where the entire underlying program is modified, as with NCLB, or 
where modifications are minor, more akin to pre-ACA amendments 
to Medicaid, Congress need jump through no special NFIB hoops, for 
those modifications should continue to pose no coercion problem. 
The fourth type of legislative response that seems likely to me 
involves new attention placed on statutory enforcement mechanisms 
for spending programs.  NFIB teaches that the threat to withdraw 
100% of a very large grant can, under certain circumstances, 
constitute coercion.  So in addition to keeping its grants smaller, 
Congress might also adjust the percentage of an award at stake for 
noncompliance.  Congress could also implement a variety of other 
enforcement mechanisms, considering whether private litigation 
might be effective;513 whether government litigation to obtain 
specific performance might be an option;514 how voluntary or self-
regulation might be integrated into an enforcement regime;515 
whether short-term federal take-over of failing programs would be 
possible;516 and so on. 
                                                          
 511. Cf. William D. Araiza, ENDA Before It Starts:  Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Availability of Damages Awards to Gay State Employees Under the 
Proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 50–58 
(2002) (recommending congressional findings to support Employment Non-
Discrimination Act). 
 512. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 n.14 
(2012) (plurality opinion); see also Bagenstos, supra note 109 (manuscript at 24–26) 
(suggesting that the plurality opinion would permit, although not require, a repeal-
and-reenactment alternative). 
 513. See generally, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement 
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012) (discussing the 
importance of private enforcement mechanisms in regulatory regimes); Pasachoff, 
supra note 364, at 1488–92 (discussing limitations of reliance on such private 
enforcement mechanisms). 
 514. See, e.g., BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS:  RACE DISCRIMINATION 
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2, 5 (1997) (discussing litigation as an enforcement 
tool as implemented by the Department of Justice). 
 515. See, e.g., Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More 
Than Merely Symbolic:  The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
361, 361–63, 365–66 (2010) (discussing self-regulation within the context of 
corporate entities). 
 516. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4:40 (Dec. 2012), 
available at Westlaw ENVLAW (describing a statutory provision for federal takeover 
of certain functions granted to the states under the Clean Water Act while 
explaining unlikeliness of its use); Joseph F. St. Cyr, OSHA and Federalism in Times of 
Crisis:  Issues in Federal and State Relations, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 273, 278–79 (2006) 
(describing a provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act under which the 
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None of these outcomes would seriously constrict Congress’s ability 
to enact or reauthorize legislation in support of the general welfare.  
Some may even promote the general welfare more than continuing 
in the same vein would.  For example, requiring congressional 
findings on the links between conditions could facilitate more precise 
and targeted solutions for problems.  Implementing shorter-term 
programs may be an easier way of promoting new understandings of 
the general welfare, as older ways of doing business may become 
politically entrenched and therefore hard to unwind.  And 
implementing a variety of different enforcement mechanisms may 
lead to better implementation and enforcement of the laws overall, 
and thus fewer wasted federal dollars.  All of these outcomes could 
conceivably find political support along the political spectrum 
(although of course they would not change politically motivated 
debate about the content of any such change). 
C. Agencies 
Professor Bagenstos has argued that NFIB will give states a tool in 
their arsenal to extract waivers of particular statutory obligations from 
agencies with oversight authority.517  He suggests that states may 
threaten to challenge conditions as unconstitutionally coercive if 
their waiver requests are not met, and that agencies may simply 
comply, either because they will not want to run the risk of losing in 
court or may wish to avoid spending the time or resources on the 
litigation.518  He also thinks it possible that agencies will stop seeking 
to enforce statutory violations that would lead to funding cut-offs in 
order to avoid a constitutional challenge.519 
Both of these scenarios are certainly plausible.  But it is important 
to note that how to respond to NFIB in waiver negotiations and 
enforcement actions is a choice for the executive to make.  One can 
also imagine an executive decision to stay the course—both with 
respect to waiver negotiations and enforcement—on the theory that 
uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of spending provisions 
is worse than the risk that the provisions will be found 
unconstitutional.  It was in a similar vein that the federal government 
                                                          
federal government may withdraw approval of a state safety and health plan and 
exercise federal jurisdiction instead). 
 517. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism By Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE 
HEALTH CARE CASE:  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (Gillian 
Metzger, Trevor Morrison & Nathaniel Persily, eds., forthcoming 2013); Bagenstos, 
supra note 109 (manuscript at 52–53). 
 518. Id. at 53. 
 519. Id. at 62. 
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sought Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act in the first place.520 
Indeed, an executive decision might also be made to do more than 
merely stay the course, but instead to more affirmatively enforce 
conditional spending statutes.  Somewhat counter-intuitively for a 
decision rooted in the coercive possibility of a threat to withhold 
funds, NFIB could actually be used as a spur to increased 
enforcement.  After all, if the federal government is going to be on 
the hook for coercion because of its theoretical ability to withhold 
100% of its large grants, regardless of the likelihood of its invoking 
that option,521 perhaps it should start taking its withholding ability 
seriously—whether by invoking that potential as a real threat or by 
actually withholding funds from persistently noncompliant recipients.  
After a brief period in the 1960s, during which time the threat to 
withhold ESEA money from southern school districts effectively 
contributed to the desegregation of those districts,522 the Department 
of Education has almost never taken steps to withhold funds, even in 
the face of significant noncompliance with various programs.523  This 
Department is not alone in this reluctance; it is a trans-agency 
reality.524 
The reason for the Department’s failure to use this enforcement 
power is partly structural; as with many agencies overseeing grants-in-
aid programs, its primary role is cooperative, designed to work with 
states to implement the programs.525  Enforcement is both second in 
time and second in priority.  Another reason is a substantive one:  
                                                          
 520. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31–32, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius 
(NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2011 WL 5025286, at *31–32; 
Consolidated Brief for Respondents at 8–9, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Nos. 11-303 and 
11-400), 2011 WL 4941020, at *8–9 (asking the Court to decide the constitutionality 
of the individual mandate). 
 521. Cf. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 n.27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring 
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (noting that agencies experience 
political pressures that may make them reluctant to cut off funds). 
 522. See STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW:  THE IRONIC LEGACY OF 
TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 44–46 (1995) (illustrating the steps taken by 
the federal government to desegregate school districts in the south). 
 523. See, e.g., supra note 435 and accompanying text; see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON 
DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS 6–7 (2000), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/7bfb3c01_5c95_4d33_94b7_b80171d0b1bc?d
ocument.pdf (describing limited federal enforcement of the IDEA over two decades). 
 524. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 109, at 62 (describing the EPA as hesitant to 
cut off funding); Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear:  A Game Theoretic 
Approach to the Biggest Sticks in an Agency’s Arsenal, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 442, 456 
(2012) (calling “[r]evocation of federal funding . . . a political taboo”). 
 525. See, e.g., Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under 
§ 1983:  The Supreme Court’s Failure To Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 
29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 292 (1996) (indicating that federal agencies’ primary 
role incorporates cooperative efforts with state governments). 
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Funding cutoffs hurt the very beneficiaries whom the money is 
supposed to aid, so the Department may be reluctant to worsen the 
plight of beneficiaries already facing ineffective state implementation 
by withdrawing federal funds.526  Yet a third reason is political:  The 
Department may be reluctant to jeopardize its own authority if state 
officials appeal to Congress or the courts and win against an effort to 
withdraw funds.527  In fact, the closest a court had come to declaring 
an Act unconstitutionally coercive before NFIB arose in just such a 
rare circumstance, when the Department took steps to cut off IDEA 
funds from Virginia for noncompliance, and the state protested and 
eventually won in court (on clear notice grounds, but a plurality of 
the en banc Fourth Circuit would also have found coercion).528 
These reasons may help explain why the funding cut-off is rarely 
invoked, but they need not justify it.  The first two reasons are matters 
for administrative regime design.  As to the first, the roles of program 
officer and enforcer might be more thoroughly separated and 
independent to encourage a less biased review of the need for 
enforcement.529  As to the second, a funding cut-off need not be a 
sledgehammer where a scalpel would be more useful; a targeted cut-
off with funds set up to assist the beneficiaries in other ways has the 
potential to be a scalpel if skillfully employed.530 
As to the third, political, reason, NFIB teaches that it is not the 
actual use of the withholding power that has the potential to 
designate a law coercive but the mere statutory existence of that 
power, rendering less valid the incentive for the Department not to 
act.531  Moreover, one wonders whether the Department actually has 
the authority it claims on paper if everyone knows the chances of its 
following through are slim.  A political showdown could have the 
                                                          
 526. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 183, 200 (describing funds cutoff as a “blunderbuss weapon” whose “effects will 
ultimately be felt by the people whom federal funding was intended to benefit”). 
 527. See, e.g., Hehir, supra note 396, at 224–28 (describing such jockeying in the 
context of the IDEA). 
 528. See supra note 80 (discussing Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 559–61 
(4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)); see also Hehir, supra note 396, at 224-25 (discussing 
broader political context of Riley). 
 529. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:  Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873–74 (2009) (proposing the 
separation of functions within the prosecutor’s office). 
 530. For example, federal funds withdrawn from public schools could be provided 
instead to private providers of supplemental education services under No Child Left 
Behind, or to other neighboring schools to educate the children in question. 
 531.  See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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beneficial effect of clarifying what the law is, one way or the other.532  
And from the Department’s standpoint, the worst that could happen 
is that Congress or the courts would remove or limit a tool from its 
arsenal that it never actually used and that no one thought it was 
likely to use anyway. 
If these implications are, in fact, what lie in store for conditional 
spending programs like federal education law in the wake of NFIB—
no large funding increases, but a proliferation of smaller competitive 
grant programs, with all programs, large and small, subject to 
increased enforcement and a wider variety of enforcement 
mechanisms—NFIB hardly represents the end of the federal 
regulatory state.  Instead, NFIB could contribute to invigorating its 
potential. 
CONCLUSION 
NFIB’s conclusion that the Medicaid expansion exceeded the scope 
of Congress’s spending power is important for its recognition that a 
conditional spending program may be unconstitutionally coercive in 
fact and not just in theory.  But this conclusion is unlikely to apply 
much more broadly, given the incomparable scope and structure of 
the Medicaid program and its expansion.  The major federal 
education programs are likely to withstand future coercion 
challenges under NFIB—and if the education programs survive, other 
conditional spending programs likely will, too, given education’s 
status as the second largest source of federal funds to the states.  
Nonetheless, Congress should take heed of NFIB’s lessons and pay 
close attention to the size and structure of both new and 
reauthorized conditional spending programs.  Agencies, too, should 
take heed of NFIB’s lessons, and—somewhat counterintuitively for a 
decision that treats an enforcement provision as coercive—could use 
the decision to justify increased enforcement of the conditional 
spending laws they oversee. 
                                                          
 532. See, e.g., Hehir, supra note 396, at 225–26 (noting that, after the showdown in 
the Fourth Circuit about the threat to withdraw IDEA funds, Congress resolved the 
“Virginia problem” statutorily in favor of the Department’s position). 
